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<h1 itemprop="headline">Longitudinal Statistics on Work Activity and Use of Employment Supports for New Social Security Disability Insurance Beneficiaries</h1>
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<div id="hByline">by <span itemprop="author">Su Liu and David C. Stapleton</span><br>Social Security Bulletin, <abbr title="Volume">Vol.</abbr> 71, <abbr title="Number">No.</abbr> 3, 2011 (released August 2011)</div>
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<p id="synopsis" itemprop="description">We present longitudinal employment and work-incentive statistics for individuals who began receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (<abbr class="spell">DI</abbr>) benefits from 1996 through 2006. For the longest-observed cohort, 28 percent returned to work, 6.5 percent had their benefits suspended for work in at least 1 month, and 3.7 percent had their benefits terminated for work. The corresponding percentages are much higher for those who were younger than age 40 when they entered the <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> program. Most first suspensions occurred within 5 years after entry. Cross-state variation in outcomes is high, and, to the extent observed, statistics for more recent cohorts are lower.</p>
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<div class="eightypercent">
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<p>Su Liu is with the Chinese University of Hong Kong School of Public Health and is a senior researcher at Mathematica Policy Research. David C. Stapleton is director of the Center for Studying Disability Policy at Mathematica.</p>
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<p>This article is based on a report prepared for the Social Security Administration as part of the evaluation of the Ticket to Work program, under contract <abbr title="number">no.</abbr> 0600-03-60130.</p>
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<p><i>Acknowledgments:</i> We would like to thank Dawn Phelps for the substantial contributions made developing the reported statistics from administrative data; Sarah Prenovitz for carefully preparing all of the charts in the article; and Paul O'Leary, Gina Livermore, Scott Muller, Kalman Rupp, Evan Schechter, and Robert Weathers for their helpful comments on earlier versions. </p>
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<p>Contents of this publication are <a href="/policy/accessibility.html">not copyrighted</a>; any items may be reprinted, but citation of the <i>Social Security Bulletin</i> as the source is requested. The findings and conclusions presented in the <i>Bulletin</i> are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Social Security Administration or Mathematica Policy Research.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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<h2>Introduction</h2>
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<div class="abbrtable">
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<table role="presentation">
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<caption>Selected Abbreviations</caption>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr></td>
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<td>average wage index</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr>BOND</abbr></td>
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<td>Benefit Offset National Demonstration</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">DI</abbr></td>
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<td>Disability Insurance</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr></td>
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<td>extended period of eligibility</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></td>
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<td>full retirement age</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr></td>
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<td>nonpayment status following suspension or termination for work</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr></td>
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<td>Rehabilitation Services Administration</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr></td>
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<td>substantial gainful employment</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr></td>
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<td>Social Security Administration</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">SSI</abbr></td>
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<td>Supplemental Security Income</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr></td>
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<td>Ticket Research File</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr></td>
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<td>Ticket to Work</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr></td>
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<td>trial work period</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><abbr class="spell">VR</abbr></td>
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<td>vocational rehabilitation</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
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</div>
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<p>Knowing how many Social Security Disability Insurance (<abbr class="spell">DI</abbr>) beneficiaries return to work and eventually have their benefits suspended and then eventually terminated for work is critical to monitoring program performance and informing policy change.<sup><a href="#mn1" id="mt1">1</a></sup> The 1999 Ticket Act includes a well-known statistic on exits for work:</p>
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<blockquote>Despite such historic opportunities and the desire of millions of disability recipients to work and support themselves, less than <span class="nobr">one-half</span> of one percent of Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries leave the disability rolls and return to work.— <i>Public Law 106-170, <span class="nobr">Section 2(a)(8).</span></i></blockquote>
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<p>This statistic, which is published by the Social Security Administration (<abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>) each year, is the percentage of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries whose benefits were terminated in the current year because they were working (<abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> 2009). Like most such statistics, it is based on the behavior of existing beneficiaries over a short period—a month or year. Statisticians call this type of statistic "cross-sectional."</p>
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<p>However, there is another important way to measure the number of beneficiaries who leave the rolls for work: by counting them <i>from the time they first receive their <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> award</i> over a period that is much longer than a year. This kind of statistic, known as "longitudinal," paints a somewhat different picture of the behavior of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries; in fact, it addresses a fundamentally different question than does the cross-sectional statistic. The longitudinal statistic shows how many <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> entrants eventually work enough to leave the program from the time they enter, while the cross-sectional statistic shows how many current beneficiaries leave the rolls for work in a given year. The values of these statistics are different for two important reasons. One is obvious: The longitudinal statistic covers a much longer period. The second is less obvious: The cross-sectional statistic gives disproportionately greater weight to those who stay on the rolls for many years and, by definition, have low exit rates. Those who enter the rolls and leave after finding work are only counted in the denominator of the statistic in the years before they leave. In contrast, the longitudinal statistic gives equal weight to all beneficiaries entering at the same time, regardless of how long they stay on the rolls.</p>
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<p>Both cross-sectional and longitudinal statistics have value. There is considerable potential for confusion between the two, however. Further, because cross-sectional statistics are readily available, it might well be that they are interpreted as longitudinal statistics; for example, some might believe that only 0.5 percent of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> entrants eventually will have their benefits terminated for work, but previous work has shown that the actual percentage is likely several times higher (discussed later). This article updates the earlier findings, expands on them in several ways, and considers the implications of the longitudinal statistics for efforts to both increase the employment and earnings of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries and reduce their reliance on the program.</p>
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<h2>Previous Longitudinal Studies</h2>
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<p>Despite their great value, longitudinal statistics are rare, perhaps because they are difficult to produce. The first work-related longitudinal statistics for <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries we find are produced from <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>'s New Beneficiary Survey and New Beneficiary Follow-up. Both samples were drawn from all Social Security beneficiaries (including those claiming benefits on the basis of age or survivorship) who were initially entitled to benefits from July 1980 through June 1981.</p>
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<p>Muller (1992) produced statistics on completion of the trial work period (<abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>)—a <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work incentive described in the next section—and employment for the New Beneficiary Survey cohort over a shorter period (the length is unclear), excluding data from the supplementary sample available in the New Beneficiary Follow-up. He found that 10.2 percent of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries had worked after entitlement, 6.1 percent had already completed a <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>, and 2.8 percent had their benefits terminated for work. The last statistic confirms that leaving the rolls after finding work is a relatively rare phenomenon, but it is not nearly as rare as what the cross-sectional statistic quoted in the introduction suggests (less than 0.5 percent). Among other things, Muller also found a very strong negative relationship between age and employment outcomes, a finding we confirm in this study.</p>
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<p>Hennessey and Muller (1994) examined the use of vocational rehabilitation (<abbr class="spell">VR</abbr>) services by New Beneficiary Survey/New Beneficiary Follow-up respondents. The authors estimated that 27 percent received at least one <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> service over approximately 10 years. Schechter (1997) estimated that 22 percent of this cohort was employed in the 10 years following entitlement.</p>
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<p>Numerous methodological differences between the earlier studies and the analyses we present here make it difficult to directly compare the findings. The New Beneficiary Survey/New Beneficiary Follow-up followed samples from a cohort of <i>disabled-worker</i> beneficiaries who were first <i>entitled</i> to benefits in a <span class="nobr">1-year</span> period; using administrative data alone, we follow 100 percent of all disabled beneficiaries, including the small share who were disabled adult children or disabled <span class="nobr">widow(er)s</span>, in cohorts that received their awards in each of several calendar years. Two specific differences in the measurement of outcomes are worth noting. Although the earlier studies used a combination of information from administrative records, folder reviews, and survey responses to determine employment, we rely solely on administrative records. The earlier studies also relied on survey responses to determine use of employment services (including those not potentially eligible for <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> financing), whereas our analysis uses administrative records of enrollment for services that were potentially eligible for <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> financing. As described later, there is also one notable programmatic difference that applied to the <span class="nobr">1980–1981</span> cohort until approximately 8 years after its entry into <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr>; this difference pertains to the period after <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion, called the extended period of eligibility (<abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>).</p>
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<p>There is also significant literature on employment rates for allowed and denied <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> applicants, in which applicants are followed for many years after filing for benefits (Bound 1989; Chen and van der Klaauw 2008; French and Song 2009; Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2011; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester, forthcoming). This literature does not examine use of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work incentives or suspensions and terminations for work.</p>
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<h2>Data Sources and Methods</h2>
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<p>The production of the longitudinal statistics we report here was made possible by using a set of analytic administrative data files constructed for the Ticket to Work (<abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr>) evaluation. These files, collectively called the Ticket Research File (<abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>), contain extensive information on the more than 20 million <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> or Supplemental Security Income (<abbr class="spell">SSI</abbr>) beneficiaries who received a benefit in at least 1 month from January 1996 through December 2007 (Page and others 2009).<sup><a href="#mn2" id="mt2">2</a></sup> For the purpose of this study, annual cohort files are constructed for each cohort from 1996 through 2005. Cohort assignment is based on the month of a beneficiary's <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> award—defined as the month in which <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> first sent a payment to the beneficiary. Each cohort is followed from its first year through 2006. Although it is possible for an individual to have multiple entitlements, he or she is assigned to just one cohort based on the year that corresponds to the individual's <i>first</i> payment.<sup><a href="#mn3" id="mt3">3</a></sup></p>
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<p>Reporting of earnings data requires access to <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>'s Master Earnings File, which includes annual earnings data derived from tax reports under rules established by the Internal Revenue Service. <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> maintains an extract of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> and <abbr class="spell">SSI</abbr> beneficiaries' earnings records represented in the <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>. To comply with security requirements for the earnings data, <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> staff produced the statistics that are based on those records and verified that the results do not disclose personal information.</p>
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<p>To obtain data on enrollment for <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> services, we also merge matched records on state <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> closures obtained from the Rehabilitation Services Administration (<abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>) for fiscal years (<abbr class="spell">FY</abbr>) <span class="nobr">1998–2007</span>, under an interagency agreement between <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> and <abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>'s parent agency, the Department of Education. These data, known as the <span class="nobr"><abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>-911</span> records, contain information on closed <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> cases only, as the state agencies only report information on individual cases when the cases are closed. The date of eligibility determination is used to establish the year of service entry.</p>
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<p>Although data are available through 2007, we end the analysis in 2006. Many of the 2007 values for <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> variables will be revised at a later date because of delays in reporting of earnings, as well as the processing time required for determining work incentive status. In addition, although we report 2006 <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> service enrollment statistics, these data are subject to substantial revisions because of the nature of the <span class="nobr"><abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>-911</span> data: Enrollment for a case is not captured in the file until the case is closed. Enrollment by a <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary in 2006 will only be recognized if the beneficiary's <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> case closed before September 2007 or the beneficiary assigned his or her ticket to the state agency. Hence, we consider the enrollment estimates for 2006 to be preliminary.<sup><a href="#mn4" id="mt4">4</a></sup></p>
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<h3>Study Population</h3>
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<p>All of the statistics presented are based on 100 percent of the relevant <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> population, including people receiving concurrent <abbr class="spell">SSI</abbr> benefits; that is, the data represent population statistics, rather than estimates. Because we are mostly interested in return-to-work issues among working-age beneficiaries, we exclude beneficiaries who died before January 1, 1996; were younger than age 18 as of December 31, 2005; or were above the full retirement age (<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr>) as of the month of initial entitlement or January 1, 1996. Disabled <span class="nobr">widow(er)s</span> and disabled adult children who otherwise met the above criteria are included along with disabled workers in each cohort. All individuals are followed through 2006, or up to benefit termination because of death, <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> attainment, or medical recovery. The size and age/sex composition of each cohort we include in this analysis is provided in the <a href="#appendix">Appendix</a> table.</p>
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<p>Changes in cohort age/sex composition over our study period suggest that even if return-to-work behavior does not change across cohorts, employment outcomes are likely to change simply because age and sex composition changes. Hence, for the cross-cohort comparisons, the national statistics are adjusted to the age/sex composition of the 2001 award cohort—the middle cohort of those examined and the last cohort prior to the <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> rollout.<sup><a href="#mn5" id="mt5">5</a></sup> The percentages of the 2001 cohort in each age/sex category are used as weights to produce the age/sex-adjusted national totals and means. Similarly, all state series are adjusted to the national age/sex composition in 2001 so that cross-state differences for the 1996 cohort do not reflect cross-state variation in cohort age/sex composition. Note that the initial national statistics for the 1996 cohort are not age/sex adjusted.</p>
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<h3>Program Work Incentives</h3>
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|
<p>The most important of the <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work incentives we examine in this study are the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>, the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>, and the <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> program.<sup><a href="#mn6" id="mt6">6</a></sup> The <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> consists of 9 months during which beneficiaries are permitted to work and earn at any level without loss of benefits, provided that they continue to meet medical eligibility requirements. The 9 months need not be consecutive—any 9 months in a <span class="nobr">60-month</span> rolling window are counted. In 2008, a beneficiary was considered to be in a <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> month if he or she had monthly earnings of at least $670 (<abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income) or was working at least 80 self-employed hours. The <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income limit increased from $200 in 2000 to $530 in 2001 and was indexed to <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>'s average wage index (<abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr>) thereafter.</p>
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|
<p>The month after the last <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> month is automatically the first month of the beneficiary's <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>. During the next 36 months, benefits are suspended if the beneficiary engages in substantial gainful activity (<abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>), that is, no benefits will be paid, except that each beneficiary has 3 grace-period months during which benefits are paid even if the beneficiary is engaged in <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>. The beneficiary is entitled to full benefits during any month of this period when he or she is not engaged in <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>, provided that benefits have not been terminated for medical recovery or some other reason. After the first 36 months of the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr> and use of any remaining grace-period months, benefits are terminated if the beneficiary engages in <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>; the now former beneficiary must reapply to obtain benefits again.<sup><a href="#mn7" id="mt7">7</a></sup> <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries may continue to have earnings and remain on the rolls until termination for some other reason if their work does not constitute <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>. The nonblind <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount was $500 from the beginning of the sample period through June 1999, after which it was increased to $700 and, starting in 2001, indexed to the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr>.<sup><a href="#mn8" id="mt8">8</a></sup> Prior to 1988, and before the sample period, the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr> during which benefits were suspended because of <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> lasted only 15 months.</p>
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<p><abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries are also eligible to enroll for employment services that <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> will pay for, provided that the beneficiary achieves sufficient earnings over a specified period. <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr>, which was implemented over 3 years starting in 2002, is the current version of this work-incentive program. At award, the beneficiary receives a "ticket" that he or she may present to any employment network to obtain services. Employment networks include all state <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> agencies and other private and public entities that meet criteria set by <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> and that have agreed to accept tickets. Because <span class="nobr"><abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>-911</span> data before <abbr class="spell">FY</abbr> 1998 have not been matched to the <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>, the service enrollment statistics we present are for the 1998 and later cohorts only.<sup><a href="#mn9" id="mt9">9</a></sup></p>
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|
<p>In general, the path from entitlement month to the termination for work month must pass the following markers in this order: award month, <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion month, and first suspension month.<sup><a href="#mn10" id="mt10">10</a></sup> Termination for work can occur after the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>, even if there is no suspension during the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>. Beneficiaries need not enroll for employment services along the way to termination for work; if that marker is passed, it may be passed at any month during the process. Benefits might be terminated for other reasons at any point along the way—most commonly because of mortality or attainment of the <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> (when retirement benefits replace <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> benefits), and less commonly because of medical recovery and other miscellaneous reasons.</p>
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<p>For each cohort, we develop a series of annual outcome measures, based on the return-to-work progress markers discussed earlier:</p>
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<ul>
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<li><abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion.</li>
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<li>Benefit suspension for work, during the first 36 months of the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>.</li>
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<li>Benefit termination for work after the 36th month of the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>. If benefits were terminated for work, the beneficiary remains in "terminated for work" status in our analysis unless he or she dies, attains the <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr>, or returns to the rolls, in which case the beneficiary's status is changed as appropriate. This does not necessarily mean that the beneficiary is continuing to engage in <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>.</li>
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<li>Number of years in nonpayment status following suspension or termination for work (<abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr>) is a composite measure of the extent to which beneficiaries are not receiving benefits because they are working.<sup><a href="#mn11" id="mt11">11</a></sup> It is defined as the total number of months with no payments following suspension or termination for work, divided by 12. After the month of suspension or termination for work, every additional month during the analysis period is counted until the month of death, <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> attainment, or return to the rolls. This cumulative measure reflects the longitudinal nature of the analysis and has implications for total program savings over a longer period.</li>
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<li>First-time service enrollment is identified when beneficiaries assign their tickets to a provider (according to the <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>) or are determined eligible for rehabilitation services (according to <span class="nobr"><abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>-911</span> files), whichever occurs earlier.<sup><a href="#mn12" id="mt12">12</a></sup> This variable only captures enrollment for services that will potentially be paid for by <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>.</li>
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<li>Employment is defined as having annual earnings of at least $1,000 in 2007 dollars, based on data from the Master Earnings File (inflation adjusted using the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr>). For each cohort, we present employment statistics starting with the second full calendar year after the award year, so that those with carried-over earnings from preaward jobs, but no subsequent earnings, are not included in the statistics.<sup><a href="#mn13" id="mt13">13</a></sup> Average earnings are calculated for all beneficiaries, including those with zero earnings. If earnings were not reported to the <abbr class="spell">IRS</abbr>, they are not reflected in the statistics.<sup><a href="#mn14" id="mt14">14</a></sup></li>
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</ul>
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<p>Many statistics we report are cumulative statistics for the above measures from award year through the year indicated (for example, percentage of beneficiaries in the 1996 award cohort having completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> <i>by the end</i> of 2006; that is, the unduplicated count of individuals who completed a <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> during the <span class="nobr">10-year</span> period, expressed as a percentage of the number in the cohort). One cumulative statistic is an exception: The cumulative employment rate covers the period from the second year after award through the year indicated.</p>
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<p>We also report mean annual earnings, adjusted to 2007 earnings levels using the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr>. For comparison purposes, in 2007 the nonblind <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount was $900 monthly and $10,800 annually. The blind <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount was $1,500 monthly and $18,000 annually.</p>
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<h2>Factors Affecting Employment and Work-Incentive Statistics over the Study Period</h2>
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<p>We have previously described the following three programmatic changes, each of which might have influenced the patterns observed in the statistics presented later: (1) the 1999 <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> increase and subsequent indexing to the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr>, (2) the 2001 increase in the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income amount, and (3) the 2002 introduction of <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr>. The 1999 <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> increase seems very likely to have reduced <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> months because some months that would have counted as <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> under the earlier <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount would not be counted as <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> under the higher <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount. In a similar fashion, the increase in the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income amount seems very likely to have reduced, or at least delayed, <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion; consequently, this might have reduced or delayed first suspension for work and termination for work. <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> was designed to increase beneficiary access to employment services and, as a result, increase or hasten employment, earnings, <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion, and <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> months.</p>
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<p>Several additional programmatic changes during the sample period might have influenced the statistics. The first is the processing of continuing disability reviews (<abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s). <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> conducts periodic medical <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s for beneficiaries deemed to have a chance of medical recovery; the agency also conducts work <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s for those who might have completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> or been engaged in <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> after the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>. The backlog of <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s was very high in the <span class="nobr">mid-1990s</span> because <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> had diverted its limited administrative resources to the processing of a high volume of applications. Congress authorized additional resources to clear the backlog, resulting in a near quadrupling of <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s from 1999 through 2002 relative to 1996 levels, after which <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s fell to approximately the same level as in 1996 (Social Security Advisory Board 2006; <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> 2010). The effect on work-incentive statistics might be mixed because increased terminations for medical recovery are quite likely to reduce <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completions and suspensions or terminations for work, but increased work <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s are quite likely to have the opposite effect.</p>
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<p>The 1999 Ticket Act resulted in the following changes besides the introduction of <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr>, all designed to encourage beneficiary work activity and reduce reliance on benefits: substantial grant programs to fund counselors and advocates for working beneficiaries, <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> system upgrades to speed up the processing of earnings information and work <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s, restrictions on the use of work activity to trigger medical <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s, and an expedited reinstatement process for those whose benefits are terminated for work (Stapleton and others 2008). The Ticket Act also provided Medicaid Infrastructure Grants in support of state efforts to provide public health insurance for workers with disabilities under Medicaid <span class="nobr">Buy-In</span> programs, including <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries.</p>
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<p>The business cycle also quite likely affected the patterns observed for some statistics.<sup><a href="#mn15" id="mt15">15</a></sup> Economic growth was very strong from before 1996 through the middle of 2000. Growth slowed down in the second half of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001, and the economy declined from April 2001 through November 2001. The recovery started in 2002, but unemployment remained high through 2003.</p>
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<h3>Data Limitations</h3>
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|
<p>The administrative data used for this analysis have limitations, like most data of its kind, stemming from the fact that it is collected for administrative, rather than research, purposes. The statistics we report all have an important administrative purpose and are generally reliable, but are also subject to errors that reflect the processing of postentitlement work (that is, determining <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> months and <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> and effectuating suspensions and terminations for work). If such errors occurred consistently over time, they would not affect trends in statistics across award cohorts. However, the postentitlement work backlog, and <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>'s effort to address this, varied over this period, which might have contributed to possible reduction of such errors during our study period. Hence, it is possible that some trends observed reflect changes in the processing of postentitlement work rather than changes in policy or the economic environment.</p>
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<p>Our employment and earnings data are based on posted earnings in the Master Earnings File, which could include items such as sick pay, vacation pay, and commissions from prior work; hence, positive earnings do not necessarily represent current employment. This is why we choose to present employment statistics starting with the second full calendar year after the award year. Still, it is possible that some individuals not actively working may be counted as "employed" in the analysis. At the same time, because we only count someone as employed if they have annual earnings of at least $1,000, some who are actually working but earning below $1,000 are not counted as employed.</p>
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<p>The measurement of <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> months is particularly challenging. We used a new indicator of <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> months developed to support the <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> evaluation. <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> is not 100 percent accurate, but has held up well to a careful review of sample cases (Schimmel and Stapleton 2011).</p>
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<p>One aspect of the <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>'s construction, coupled with the sometimes lengthy period between entitlement month and award month, made it difficult to definitively identify the first award year for a small share of beneficiaries. Although the <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr> covers beneficiaries in 1996 and later, its benefit data date back to January 1994. For those individuals whose initial entitlement month was prior to that, we cannot be certain that the first month with a payment appearing in the <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr> is the first award month. We developed a rule to address this issue, which is necessarily imperfect. No doubt we excluded some beneficiaries in each award cohort that should have been included and vice versa. Such errors are very small as a percentage of all beneficiaries in each award cohort, and there is no reason to think those errors have a material impact on the statistics. We were particularly concerned about impacts for the earliest cohorts, which have the largest percentage of ambiguous cases because of the nature of the ambiguity, but discovered that our major findings changed very little when we omitted all of the ambiguous cases.<sup><a href="#mn16" id="mt16">16</a></sup></p>
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<h2>Major Findings</h2>
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|
<p>We summarize findings from the 1996 award cohort first by documenting the different pathways that led beneficiaries to benefit termination. We then present a series of longitudinal statistics on employment, earnings, and use of work incentives for the entire cohort and by age groups. Key statistics are then compared across states with statistics from more recent award cohorts. We then compare selected statistics for later cohorts with those for the 1996 cohort.</p>
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|
<h3>1996 <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> Award Cohort</h3>
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<p>Chart 1 shows the progression toward termination for work for the entire 1996 award cohort.<sup><a href="#mn17" id="mt17">17</a></sup> The number of beneficiaries reaching the return-to-work markers and the percentage of the total cohort those figures represent are shown in the boxes. The routes through which beneficiaries reach each marker and how many beneficiaries follow the specific route from the previous marker are presented outside of the boxes. The bottom boxes show the status of beneficiaries in December 2006, the end of our study period.</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart1">Chart 1.<br>Paths toward benefit termination for work for the 1996 award cohort, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart01.gif" alt="Flowchart with text description below." width="700" height="852" /></div>
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<div class="altText"><a class="altTextToggle" href="">Show text description</a>
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<div class="align-left">
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<p class="noindent"><b>Text description for Chart 1.<br>Paths toward benefit termination for work for the 1996 award cohort, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></b></p>
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<p class="noindent">Chart 1 shows the progression toward termination for work for the entire 1996 award cohort. The number of beneficiaries reaching the return-to-work markers and the percentage of the total cohort those figures represent are shown in the boxes. The routes through which beneficiaries reach each marker and how many beneficiaries follow the specific route from the previous marker are presented outside of the boxes. The bottom boxes show the status of beneficiaries in December 2006, the end of our study period.</p>
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<p class="noindent">We find that among the 591,493 awards in 1996, 46 percent of the awardees were on the rolls in December 2006, including 40 percent who did not use any <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work incentives. Of the 54 percent who were no longer on the rolls, most (50 percent of the cohort) had exited for reasons other than work—attainment of the <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr>, death, or medical recovery. Of the 50 percent who exited the rolls for reasons other than for work, almost 98 percent were off the rolls in December 2006, and 2 percent had their benefits reinstated in the same period. Over 10 percent made some progress toward termination for work by completing the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>. Of that figure, nearly 9 percent were terminated for reasons other than work, while 28 percent remained on the rolls in December 2006. A substantial majority of those who completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> (63 percent, or 6.5 percent of the cohort) went on to have their benefits suspended for work in at least 1 month, and more than half of those eventually had their benefits terminated for work—3.7 percent of the cohort. Of the 63 percent who had their benefits suspended for work, about 19 percent went on to have their benefits terminated for reasons other than work, and 25 percent were back on the rolls in December 2006.</p>
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<p class="noindent">Nearly 27 percent of the 1996 awardees whose benefits were terminated for work in their first 10 years on the rolls had their benefits reinstated by December 2006, and 73 percent were off the rolls by the same period.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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<div class="lastNote">NOTE: One return-to-work marker not captured here is service enrollment.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>We find that 46 percent of the 1996 awardees were on the rolls in December 2006, including 40 percent who did not use any <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work incentives. Of the 54 percent who were no longer on the rolls, most (50 percent of the cohort) had exited for reasons other than work—attainment of the <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr>, death, or medical recovery. Over 10 percent made some progress toward termination for work by completing the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>. A substantial majority of those (63 percent, or 6.5 percent of the cohort) went on to have their benefits suspended for work in at least 1 month, and more than half of those eventually had their benefits terminated for work—3.7 percent of the cohort.</p>
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<p>Nearly 27 percent of the 1996 awardees whose benefits were terminated for work in their first 10 years on the rolls had their benefits reinstated by December 2006. This highlights the importance of another dimension of measuring beneficiary work activity and the extent to which beneficiaries actually forego benefit payments for work: the duration of time off the rolls for work. Chart 2 shows the number of <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> years per thousand awardees. As of December 2006, the cohort had accumulated 230 <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> years per thousand beneficiaries—less than 3 months per beneficiary over 10 plus years. This is equivalent to 2.3 percent of all possible months, or 3.4 percent of those months in which their benefits were not terminated for some other reasons. Although small in percentage terms, the total amount of benefits these months represent is substantial. The magnitude of benefits in 2008 dollars can be assessed by assuming that the mean benefit foregone was equal to the average amount ($1,063) for all <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries in December 2008. That assumption yields an estimate of $2.9 million per thousand beneficiaries or $1.7 billion for the entire 1996 cohort.<sup><a href="#mn18" id="mt18">18</a></sup></p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart2">Chart 2.<br>Cumulative years with benefits suspended or terminated for work (per 1,000 beneficiaries) for the 1996 award cohort, by age group at award, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart02.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="351" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 2. </span>Cumulative years with benefits suspended or terminated for work (per 1,000 beneficiaries) for the 1996 award cohort, by age group at award, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></caption>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="4" style="width:6em"></colgroup>
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<thead>
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<tr>
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<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
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<th colspan="4" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Age group at award</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">18–39</span></th>
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">40–49</span></th>
|
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">50–61</span></th>
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></span></th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
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<td>0.20</td>
|
|
<td>0.09</td>
|
|
<td>0.08</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
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<td>2.88</td>
|
|
<td>1.33</td>
|
|
<td>1.18</td>
|
|
<td>0.05</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>11.03</td>
|
|
<td>5.09</td>
|
|
<td>3.96</td>
|
|
<td>0.14</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>23.06</td>
|
|
<td>10.37</td>
|
|
<td>7.31</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>37.64</td>
|
|
<td>16.57</td>
|
|
<td>10.69</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>54.04</td>
|
|
<td>23.46</td>
|
|
<td>14.12</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>71.30</td>
|
|
<td>30.71</td>
|
|
<td>17.27</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>89.17</td>
|
|
<td>38.12</td>
|
|
<td>20.12</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>107.51</td>
|
|
<td>45.51</td>
|
|
<td>22.65</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>125.87</td>
|
|
<td>52.84</td>
|
|
<td>24.74</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>144.03</td>
|
|
<td>59.91</td>
|
|
<td>26.40</td>
|
|
<td>0.16</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
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</tbody>
|
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<tfoot>
|
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<tr>
|
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<td class="noNotes" colspan="5"> </td>
|
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</tr>
|
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</tfoot>
|
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</table>
|
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</div>
|
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<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
|
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<div class="lastNote">NOTE: The contribution of the oldest age group is so small that it is not clearly visible on the chart.</div>
|
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>Because of differences in the characteristics of younger and older beneficiaries—such as impairments, benefit amounts, assets, and motivation—we conduct most of our analyses by age groups (<span class="nobr">18–39</span>, <span class="nobr">40–49</span>, <span class="nobr">50–61</span>, and 62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr>). Chart 2 shows that a large majority of cumulative years of benefit suspension or termination for work (62 percent as of 2006) is attributable to the youngest age group, even though this group accounts for less than 25 percent of the cohort. Those in the <span class="nobr">40–49</span> age group are close in number to the youngest group (24 percent of the cohort), but account for a much smaller share of years off the rolls for work (26 percent). Only a small minority (11 percent) is accounted for by those aged <span class="nobr">50–61</span> at the time of award, even though that age group is by far the largest of the four groups (almost 45 percent of all beneficiaries in the cohort). The contribution of the oldest age group is so small that it is not clearly visible in the chart. The age-group pattern reflects higher levels of employment and lower mortality among younger beneficiaries, along with the fact that most surviving beneficiaries in the two oldest cohorts attained the <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> during the <span class="nobr">10-year</span> study period.</p>
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<p>Statistics on the extent to which beneficiaries return to work and make progress toward termination for work are also of significant interest to policymakers and others. As with exit statistics, the statistics most often cited are cross-sectional in nature. For instance, Livermore, Stapleton, and Roche (2009) found that less than 13 percent of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr>-only beneficiaries and 15 percent of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries concurrently receiving <abbr class="spell">SSI</abbr> benefits reported having worked during the previous year, based on the 2006 National Beneficiary Survey.</p>
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<p>Longitudinal statistics show that a much larger percentage of beneficiaries eventually return to work (Chart 3). By 2006, 28 percent of the beneficiaries in the 1996 award cohort had worked (earning more than $1,000) in at least 1 year since the second postaward year. Cumulative employment rates increase each year, indicating that beneficiaries not employed previously are becoming employed for the first time, but the rate of increase steadily diminishes. By the fifth year after award (2001), the weighted cumulative rate is 23.5 percent, and this rate only increases by 4.5 percentage points through the 10th year (2006). Not surprisingly, cumulative employment rates for the youngest group are much higher than for all older groups: 46 percent of the youngest group had worked in at least 1 year by 2006, compared with 29 percent, 20 percent, and 23 percent for those aged <span class="nobr">40–49</span>, <span class="nobr">50–61</span>, and 62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> at award, respectively. The fact that the cumulative rate is higher for the oldest age group than for the next oldest age group might reflect the attainment of the <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> for some members of the oldest group by the end of the third year after award. Once that age is attained, beneficiaries can earn above the <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount without risk of benefit loss.</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart3">Chart 3.<br>Cumulative percentage employed for the 1996 award cohort, by age group at award, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart03.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="361" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 3. </span>Cumulative percentage employed for the 1996 award cohort, by age group at award, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span></caption>
|
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
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<colgroup span="5" style="width:6em"></colgroup>
|
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<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
|
|
<th colspan="5" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Age group at award</th>
|
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</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">18–39</span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">40–49</span></th>
|
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">50–61</span></th>
|
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></span></th>
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<th scope="col">All ages</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
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<td>24.63</td>
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|
<td>15.80</td>
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<td>11.42</td>
|
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<td>14.14</td>
|
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<td>15.54</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
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<td>31.23</td>
|
|
<td>19.50</td>
|
|
<td>13.36</td>
|
|
<td>17.00</td>
|
|
<td>18.98</td>
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</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
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<td>36.08</td>
|
|
<td>22.37</td>
|
|
<td>15.10</td>
|
|
<td>19.47</td>
|
|
<td>21.72</td>
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</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
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<td>38.99</td>
|
|
<td>24.17</td>
|
|
<td>16.35</td>
|
|
<td>20.81</td>
|
|
<td>23.48</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
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<td>40.98</td>
|
|
<td>25.37</td>
|
|
<td>17.29</td>
|
|
<td>21.67</td>
|
|
<td>24.71</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
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<td>42.50</td>
|
|
<td>26.36</td>
|
|
<td>18.11</td>
|
|
<td>22.22</td>
|
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<td>25.71</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
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<td>43.89</td>
|
|
<td>27.21</td>
|
|
<td>18.80</td>
|
|
<td>22.59</td>
|
|
<td>26.57</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>45.10</td>
|
|
<td>27.92</td>
|
|
<td>19.42</td>
|
|
<td>22.94</td>
|
|
<td>27.32</td>
|
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</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>46.20</td>
|
|
<td>28.58</td>
|
|
<td>20.03</td>
|
|
<td>23.24</td>
|
|
<td>28.03</td>
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</tr>
|
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</tbody>
|
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<tfoot>
|
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<tr>
|
|
<td class="noNotes" colspan="6"> </td>
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</tr>
|
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</tfoot>
|
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</table>
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</div>
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<div class="onlyNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>The cumulative percentage of employed beneficiaries we report is the percentage of the 1996 cohort that worked <i>in at least 1 year</i> from 1998 through the year indicated on the horizontal axis. The percentage employed <i>in each year</i> (Chart 4) is smaller, as some who return to work do not continue to work in every subsequent year. The annual percentage of working beneficiaries peaks in 2000, 5 years after the award and at the beginning of the recession. This pattern is consistent across age groups with the notable exception of the oldest age group, for which employment monotonically declines. For the youngest age group (<span class="nobr">18–39</span>), the annual percentage employed peaks at nearly 28 percent in 2000 and then declines gradually to just over 24 percent by 2006. Of the 46 percent of the youngest age group that worked in at least 1 year, more than half worked in the 10th year after award. For the other age groups, fewer than half of those who worked in at least 1 year were working in the 10th year after the award.<sup><a href="#mn19" id="mt19">19</a></sup> The oldest age group <span class="nobr">(62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr>)</span> has a higher employment rate than the second oldest age group (<span class="nobr">50–61</span>) in the second and third year after award; the two rates are essentially the same in the fourth year, and thereafter the rate for the oldest group is lower. This might reflect the difference in timing of <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> attainment for the two groups, as well as differences in other characteristics at the time of award and any direct effect of age on earnings.</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart4">Chart 4.<br>Annual percentage employed for the 1996 award cohort, by age group at award, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart04.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="360" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 4. </span>Annual percentage employed for the 1996 award cohort, by age group at award, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span></caption>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
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<colgroup span="5" style="width:6em"></colgroup>
|
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<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
|
|
<th colspan="5" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Age group at award</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">18–39</span></th>
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">40–49</span></th>
|
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">50–61</span></th>
|
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<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></span></th>
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<th scope="col">All ages</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
|
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>24.63</td>
|
|
<td>15.80</td>
|
|
<td>11.42</td>
|
|
<td>14.14</td>
|
|
<td>15.54</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>26.37</td>
|
|
<td>16.02</td>
|
|
<td>10.79</td>
|
|
<td>12.11</td>
|
|
<td>15.53</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>27.85</td>
|
|
<td>16.55</td>
|
|
<td>10.68</td>
|
|
<td>10.99</td>
|
|
<td>15.85</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>27.03</td>
|
|
<td>15.78</td>
|
|
<td>9.63</td>
|
|
<td>9.44</td>
|
|
<td>14.91</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>25.77</td>
|
|
<td>15.00</td>
|
|
<td>8.86</td>
|
|
<td>7.81</td>
|
|
<td>13.98</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>24.81</td>
|
|
<td>14.27</td>
|
|
<td>8.22</td>
|
|
<td>6.92</td>
|
|
<td>13.22</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>24.41</td>
|
|
<td>13.66</td>
|
|
<td>7.56</td>
|
|
<td>5.97</td>
|
|
<td>12.61</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>24.27</td>
|
|
<td>13.22</td>
|
|
<td>6.89</td>
|
|
<td>5.25</td>
|
|
<td>12.10</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>24.13</td>
|
|
<td>12.85</td>
|
|
<td>6.42</td>
|
|
<td>4.69</td>
|
|
<td>11.73</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tbody>
|
|
<tfoot>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td class="noNotes" colspan="6"> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tfoot>
|
|
</table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="onlyNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<p>Mean annual earnings (including those with zero earnings) for the entire cohort do not exhibit a strong pattern over the <span class="nobr">10-year</span> period, but the cohort means disguise differences across the age groups (Chart 5). The youngest age group (<span class="nobr">18–39</span>) experiences a substantial increase throughout the period, especially from 1998 through 2000, and the increase continues after their employment rate starts to drop in 2001. With one exception, the means for those who are employed in the youngest two age groups are above the annual nonblind <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount ($10,800) in every year (Chart 6). The exception is for the youngest age group in 1998 ($8,108). Remarkably, mean earnings for the youngest age group rise faster than for the next youngest age group (<span class="nobr">40–49</span>), surpassing the latter in 2003 and reaching $15,790 in 2007. Note also that growth continued through the 2001 recession. One possible explanation for this growth is that the shrinking number of employed beneficiaries (or former beneficiaries) in the youngest group represents those able to achieve the highest earnings. Presumably the same phenomenon would apply to the other groups, but perhaps to a lesser degree. Another possible explanation for the relative high growth of earnings for the youngest group is that, on average, they initially invest more heavily in training or education, which pays off later in terms of higher earnings.<sup><a href="#mn20" id="mt20">20</a></sup> The relative means for the oldest and next oldest age groups reflect the same pattern as their relative employment rates, shown in Chart 4, and quite likely reflect the timing of <abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr> attainment.</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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|
<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart5">Chart 5.<br>Mean annual earnings, by age group, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span> (in 2007 dollars)</div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart05.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="352" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
|
|
<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 5. </span>Mean annual earnings, by age group, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span> (in 2007 dollars)</caption>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="5" style="width:6em"></colgroup>
|
|
<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
|
|
<th colspan="5" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Age group</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">18–39</span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">40–49</span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">50–61</span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col">All ages</th>
|
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</tr>
|
|
</thead>
|
|
<tbody>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>2,953.67</td>
|
|
<td>2,286.95</td>
|
|
<td>1,501.41</td>
|
|
<td>1,757.81</td>
|
|
<td>2,003.48</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>3,511.58</td>
|
|
<td>2,422.05</td>
|
|
<td>1,385.72</td>
|
|
<td>1,288.29</td>
|
|
<td>2,067.88</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>4,055.75</td>
|
|
<td>2,552.67</td>
|
|
<td>1,301.52</td>
|
|
<td>1,323.52</td>
|
|
<td>2,180.77</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>4,259.81</td>
|
|
<td>2,587.32</td>
|
|
<td>1,193.45</td>
|
|
<td>1,088.13</td>
|
|
<td>2,169.71</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>4,292.73</td>
|
|
<td>2,528.67</td>
|
|
<td>1,105.88</td>
|
|
<td>914.43</td>
|
|
<td>2,111.62</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>4,319.83</td>
|
|
<td>2,438.08</td>
|
|
<td>1,016.74</td>
|
|
<td>885.14</td>
|
|
<td>2,053.17</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>4,375.48</td>
|
|
<td>2,353.10</td>
|
|
<td>914.60</td>
|
|
<td>744.49</td>
|
|
<td>1,986.99</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>4,420.17</td>
|
|
<td>2,279.97</td>
|
|
<td>820.06</td>
|
|
<td>629.24</td>
|
|
<td>1,927.40</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>4,488.11</td>
|
|
<td>2,210.19</td>
|
|
<td>760.75</td>
|
|
<td>532.68</td>
|
|
<td>1,890.95</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tbody>
|
|
<tfoot>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td class="noNotes" colspan="6"> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tfoot>
|
|
</table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="onlyNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="chartCenter">
|
|
<div class="chart700">
|
|
<div class="title" id="chart6">Chart 6.<br>Mean annual earnings for those with positive earnings among the 1996 award cohort, by age group, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span> (in 2007 dollars)</div>
|
|
<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart06.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="348" /></div>
|
|
<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
|
|
<table>
|
|
<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 6. </span>Mean annual earnings for those with positive earnings among the 1996 award cohort, by age group, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span> (in 2007 dollars)</caption>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="5" style="width:6em"></colgroup>
|
|
<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
|
|
<th colspan="5" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Age group</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">18–39</span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">40–49</span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">50–61</span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col"><span class="nobr">62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></span></th>
|
|
<th scope="col">All ages</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</thead>
|
|
<tbody>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>9,458</td>
|
|
<td>11,526</td>
|
|
<td>10,102</td>
|
|
<td>9,716</td>
|
|
<td>10,160</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>10,749</td>
|
|
<td>12,328</td>
|
|
<td>9,967</td>
|
|
<td>8,108</td>
|
|
<td>10,455</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>12,002</td>
|
|
<td>12,690</td>
|
|
<td>9,509</td>
|
|
<td>9,154</td>
|
|
<td>10,675</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>13,159</td>
|
|
<td>13,680</td>
|
|
<td>9,662</td>
|
|
<td>9,006</td>
|
|
<td>11,225</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>13,957</td>
|
|
<td>14,113</td>
|
|
<td>9,810</td>
|
|
<td>9,118</td>
|
|
<td>11,591</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>14,625</td>
|
|
<td>14,310</td>
|
|
<td>9,645</td>
|
|
<td>9,997</td>
|
|
<td>11,767</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>15,092</td>
|
|
<td>14,422</td>
|
|
<td>9,363</td>
|
|
<td>9,488</td>
|
|
<td>11,726</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>15,394</td>
|
|
<td>14,474</td>
|
|
<td>9,083</td>
|
|
<td>9,157</td>
|
|
<td>11,650</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>15,790</td>
|
|
<td>14,416</td>
|
|
<td>9,027</td>
|
|
<td>8,692</td>
|
|
<td>11,664</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tbody>
|
|
<tfoot>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td class="noNotes" colspan="6"> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tfoot>
|
|
</table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="onlyNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<p>The two patterns that dominate the cumulative employment statistics—rapidly diminishing growth after 5 years on the rolls and much higher rates for the youngest cohort—are repeated in the statistics for other markers. Chart 7 presents cumulative statistics for the percentages of the 1996 award cohort that complete the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>, have their benefits suspended for work, and have their benefits terminated for work. The first two of those return-to-work markers all increase rapidly during the first 5 years on the rolls, with the rate of increase diminishing rapidly thereafter. The cumulative percentage terminated for work mirrors the same pattern, but with a delay of 3 to 4 years, reflecting the fact that benefits cannot be terminated for work until the <span class="nobr">9-month</span> <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> and the first 36 months of the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr> have been completed. Age differences are displayed in Chart 8.</p>
|
|
<div class="chartCenter">
|
|
<div class="chart700">
|
|
<div class="title" id="chart7">Chart 7.<br>Age/sex-adjusted cumulative longitudinal work-incentive statistics for the 1996 award cohort, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
|
|
<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart07.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="315" /></div>
|
|
<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
|
|
<table>
|
|
<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 7. </span>Age/sex-adjusted cumulative longitudinal work-incentive statistics for the 1996 award cohort, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></caption>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="3" style="width:10em"></colgroup>
|
|
<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stubHeading" scope="col">Year</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">Completed <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr></th>
|
|
<th scope="col">Benefits suspended because of work for at least 1 month</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">Benefits terminated because of work</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</thead>
|
|
<tbody>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
|
<td>0.67</td>
|
|
<td>0.13</td>
|
|
<td>0.01</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
|
<td>2.67</td>
|
|
<td>1.10</td>
|
|
<td>0.03</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>4.37</td>
|
|
<td>2.39</td>
|
|
<td>0.11</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>5.65</td>
|
|
<td>3.36</td>
|
|
<td>0.33</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>6.70</td>
|
|
<td>4.15</td>
|
|
<td>1.09</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>7.22</td>
|
|
<td>4.76</td>
|
|
<td>1.77</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>7.55</td>
|
|
<td>5.18</td>
|
|
<td>2.28</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>7.83</td>
|
|
<td>5.52</td>
|
|
<td>2.72</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>8.12</td>
|
|
<td>5.78</td>
|
|
<td>3.06</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>8.40</td>
|
|
<td>6.01</td>
|
|
<td>3.31</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>8.65</td>
|
|
<td>6.16</td>
|
|
<td>3.47</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tbody>
|
|
<tfoot>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td class="noNotes" colspan="4"> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tfoot>
|
|
</table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
|
|
<div class="lastNote">NOTE: Weights were used to adjust the series to reflect the age/sex composition of the 2001 award cohort. See the text for details.</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="chartCenter">
|
|
<div class="chart700">
|
|
<div class="title" id="chart8">Chart 8.<br>Cumulative longitudinal work-incentive statistics for the 1996 awardee cohort, by age group, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
|
|
<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart08.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="859" /></div>
|
|
<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
|
|
<table>
|
|
<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 8. </span>Cumulative longitudinal work-incentive statistics for the 1996 awardee cohort, by age group, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></caption>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="3" style="width:10em"></colgroup>
|
|
<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stubHeading" scope="col">Year</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">Completed <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr></th>
|
|
<th scope="col">Benefits suspended because of work for at least 1 month</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">Benefits terminated because of work</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</thead>
|
|
<tbody>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<th colspan="3" class="panel" scope="rowgroup"><span class="nobr">18–39</span></th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
|
<td>1.48</td>
|
|
<td>0.30</td>
|
|
<td>0.02</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
|
<td>5.88</td>
|
|
<td>2.46</td>
|
|
<td>0.09</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>9.94</td>
|
|
<td>5.68</td>
|
|
<td>0.30</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>13.10</td>
|
|
<td>8.25</td>
|
|
<td>0.89</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>15.54</td>
|
|
<td>10.33</td>
|
|
<td>2.83</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>16.72</td>
|
|
<td>11.91</td>
|
|
<td>4.71</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>17.49</td>
|
|
<td>13.00</td>
|
|
<td>6.13</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>18.13</td>
|
|
<td>13.86</td>
|
|
<td>7.38</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>18.77</td>
|
|
<td>14.57</td>
|
|
<td>8.30</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>19.43</td>
|
|
<td>15.20</td>
|
|
<td>8.98</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>20.05</td>
|
|
<td>15.61</td>
|
|
<td>9.47</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<th colspan="3" class="panel" scope="rowgroup"><span class="nobr">40–49</span></th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
|
<td>0.65</td>
|
|
<td>0.12</td>
|
|
<td>0.01</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
|
<td>2.82</td>
|
|
<td>1.21</td>
|
|
<td>0.04</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>4.71</td>
|
|
<td>2.66</td>
|
|
<td>0.13</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>6.15</td>
|
|
<td>3.78</td>
|
|
<td>0.38</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>7.43</td>
|
|
<td>4.70</td>
|
|
<td>1.25</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>8.13</td>
|
|
<td>5.43</td>
|
|
<td>2.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>8.55</td>
|
|
<td>5.95</td>
|
|
<td>2.58</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>8.90</td>
|
|
<td>6.34</td>
|
|
<td>3.09</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>9.27</td>
|
|
<td>6.65</td>
|
|
<td>3.52</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>9.66</td>
|
|
<td>6.91</td>
|
|
<td>3.83</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>9.96</td>
|
|
<td>7.11</td>
|
|
<td>4.01</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<th colspan="3" class="panel" scope="rowgroup"><span class="nobr">50–61</span></th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
|
<td>0.39</td>
|
|
<td>0.06</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
|
<td>1.46</td>
|
|
<td>0.57</td>
|
|
<td>0.01</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>2.20</td>
|
|
<td>1.06</td>
|
|
<td>0.03</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>2.71</td>
|
|
<td>1.38</td>
|
|
<td>0.11</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>3.16</td>
|
|
<td>1.63</td>
|
|
<td>0.38</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>3.36</td>
|
|
<td>1.83</td>
|
|
<td>0.59</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>3.50</td>
|
|
<td>1.95</td>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>3.62</td>
|
|
<td>2.06</td>
|
|
<td>0.81</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>3.73</td>
|
|
<td>2.12</td>
|
|
<td>0.89</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>3.83</td>
|
|
<td>2.18</td>
|
|
<td>0.93</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>3.91</td>
|
|
<td>2.22</td>
|
|
<td>0.97</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<th colspan="3" class="panel" scope="rowgroup"><span class="nobr">62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></span></th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
|
<td>0.10</td>
|
|
<td>0.02</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
|
<td>0.51</td>
|
|
<td>0.18</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>0.69</td>
|
|
<td>0.33</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>0.70</td>
|
|
<td>0.34</td>
|
|
<td>0.00</td>
|
|
</tr>
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</tbody>
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<tfoot>
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<tr>
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<td class="noNotes" colspan="4"> </td>
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</tr>
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</tfoot>
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</table>
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</div>
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<div class="onlyNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>The previous figures do not show one important return-to-work marker because of incomplete data for the 1996 cohort: service enrollment. A separate analysis (data not shown) for the 1998 cohort—the first cohort with complete data—finds that a large majority of those whose benefits were suspended or terminated for work by 2006 (79 percent) had not enrolled for employment services, or at least had not done so with providers that would be eligible for payment from <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>. However, service receipt could have made critical contributions to suspensions and terminations for work among those who did enroll. We find that 38,327 beneficiaries (6.6 percent of the 1998 cohort) had enrolled for services by 2006. <span class="nobr">One-third</span> of those had also completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> (33.5 percent), 17.7 percent had their benefits suspended for work in at least 1 month, and 8.4 percent had their benefits terminated for work. Thus, only a minority of service users achieves each of these markers. Nevertheless, the rates at which they achieve these markers are well above the corresponding rates for the entire 1998 award cohort, which are very similar to those for the 1996 cohort.<sup><a href="#mn21" id="mt21">21</a></sup> It could be that services received were instrumental to the outcomes for those whose benefits were suspended or terminated for work.</p>
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<h3>State Variation</h3>
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<p>Chart 9 illustrates cross-state variation in employment and work-incentive statistics for the 1996 award cohort as of 2006, the 10th full year after award, adjusted to the national age/sex distribution for the 2001 award cohort. The full length of each bar (that is, the length of all four components combined) is the cumulative percentage employed for the corresponding geographic area (individual state, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, or the entire United States), and the areas have been ordered from lowest to highest by this measure. Moving from left to right, the first component of each bar represents the percentage with benefits ever terminated for work; the combined first and second components represent the percentage with benefits ever suspended for work; and the combined first, second, and third components represent the percentage having completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>.<sup><a href="#mn22" id="mt22">22</a></sup> Taking South Dakota, the state with the highest percentage employed, as an example, we find that 5.7 percent of its weighted 1996 award cohort had benefits terminated for work, 9 percent had benefits suspended for work, 16.6 percent completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>, and 41.5 percent were employed at some point during our study period (<span class="nobr">1996–2006</span>).</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart9">Chart 9.<br>Age/sex-adjusted cumulative work-incentive statistics for the 1996 award cohort, by state,<span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart09.gif" alt="Bar chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="800" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 9. </span>Age/sex-adjusted cumulative work-incentive statistics for the 1996 award cohort, by state,<span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></caption>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:10em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="4" style="width:10em"></colgroup>
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<thead>
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<tr>
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<th class="stubHeading" scope="col">State</th>
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<th scope="col">Benefits terminated because of work</th>
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<th scope="col">Benefits suspended because of work for at least 1 month</th>
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<th scope="col">Completed <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr></th>
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<th scope="col">Employed</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">South Dakota</th>
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<td>5.66</td>
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<td>3.35</td>
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<td>7.55</td>
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<td>24.96</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Minnesota</th>
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<td>5.95</td>
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<td>4.06</td>
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<td>6.29</td>
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<td>24.41</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">North Dakota</th>
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<td>3.73</td>
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<td>4.39</td>
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<td>6.32</td>
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<td>25.39</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Iowa</th>
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<td>4.17</td>
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<td>3.12</td>
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<td>6.66</td>
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<td>24.14</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Wyoming</th>
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<td>3.76</td>
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|
<td>4.40</td>
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|
<td>3.27</td>
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<td>26.49</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Wisconsin</th>
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|
<td>4.78</td>
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<td>3.68</td>
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<td>5.83</td>
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<td>23.21</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Delaware</th>
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<td>4.06</td>
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<td>3.65</td>
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<td>2.24</td>
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<td>26.88</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Colorado</th>
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<td>5.05</td>
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|
<td>3.81</td>
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<td>3.45</td>
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<td>24.38</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Vermont</th>
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<td>4.36</td>
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<td>3.21</td>
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<td>6.86</td>
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<td>22.21</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">New Hampshire</th>
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<td>4.97</td>
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|
<td>3.71</td>
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<td>6.13</td>
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<td>21.71</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Utah</th>
|
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<td>4.74</td>
|
|
<td>3.15</td>
|
|
<td>3.73</td>
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<td>24.50</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Nebraska</th>
|
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<td>4.22</td>
|
|
<td>3.18</td>
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<td>5.29</td>
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<td>22.94</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Massachusetts</th>
|
|
<td>5.54</td>
|
|
<td>3.51</td>
|
|
<td>3.30</td>
|
|
<td>21.43</td>
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|
</tr>
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<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">Kansas</th>
|
|
<td>4.42</td>
|
|
<td>3.16</td>
|
|
<td>4.54</td>
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<td>21.66</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Arizona</th>
|
|
<td>3.80</td>
|
|
<td>3.22</td>
|
|
<td>2.09</td>
|
|
<td>24.56</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Michigan</th>
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|
<td>3.99</td>
|
|
<td>2.81</td>
|
|
<td>2.60</td>
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|
<td>24.09</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Idaho</th>
|
|
<td>3.81</td>
|
|
<td>3.92</td>
|
|
<td>4.17</td>
|
|
<td>21.23</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Montant</th>
|
|
<td>4.40</td>
|
|
<td>2.00</td>
|
|
<td>4.83</td>
|
|
<td>21.81</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Alaska</th>
|
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<td>4.51</td>
|
|
<td>3.19</td>
|
|
<td>2.66</td>
|
|
<td>22.66</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Washington</th>
|
|
<td>4.62</td>
|
|
<td>3.40</td>
|
|
<td>3.32</td>
|
|
<td>20.49</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Illinois</th>
|
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<td>4.81</td>
|
|
<td>3.25</td>
|
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<td>3.33</td>
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<td>20.29</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Connecticut</th>
|
|
<td>3.96</td>
|
|
<td>2.81</td>
|
|
<td>4.44</td>
|
|
<td>20.42</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">District of Columbia</th>
|
|
<td>5.18</td>
|
|
<td>3.24</td>
|
|
<td>1.73</td>
|
|
<td>21.25</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Ohio</th>
|
|
<td>4.17</td>
|
|
<td>3.15</td>
|
|
<td>2.90</td>
|
|
<td>20.67</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Missouri</th>
|
|
<td>3.11</td>
|
|
<td>3.04</td>
|
|
<td>3.73</td>
|
|
<td>20.79</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Maine</th>
|
|
<td>3.36</td>
|
|
<td>2.97</td>
|
|
<td>3.62</td>
|
|
<td>20.46</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Oregon</th>
|
|
<td>3.74</td>
|
|
<td>3.00</td>
|
|
<td>3.47</td>
|
|
<td>19.90</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Indiana</th>
|
|
<td>3.51</td>
|
|
<td>2.62</td>
|
|
<td>3.45</td>
|
|
<td>19.80</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Nevada</th>
|
|
<td>3.46</td>
|
|
<td>3.75</td>
|
|
<td>1.93</td>
|
|
<td>19.95</td>
|
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</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">New Mexico</th>
|
|
<td>2.94</td>
|
|
<td>2.27</td>
|
|
<td>2.54</td>
|
|
<td>21.02</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">California</th>
|
|
<td>3.88</td>
|
|
<td>2.97</td>
|
|
<td>1.80</td>
|
|
<td>19.97</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Rhode Island</th>
|
|
<td>3.65</td>
|
|
<td>2.79</td>
|
|
<td>3.61</td>
|
|
<td>18.50</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">Maryland</th>
|
|
<td>3.91</td>
|
|
<td>2.60</td>
|
|
<td>2.04</td>
|
|
<td>19.97</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">All states</th>
|
|
<td>3.47</td>
|
|
<td>2.73</td>
|
|
<td>2.40</td>
|
|
<td>19.40</td>
|
|
</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">North Carolina</th>
|
|
<td>2.74</td>
|
|
<td>2.24</td>
|
|
<td>2.14</td>
|
|
<td>19.88</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Pennsylvania</th>
|
|
<td>3.40</td>
|
|
<td>2.45</td>
|
|
<td>2.52</td>
|
|
<td>18.57</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">New Jersey</th>
|
|
<td>3.85</td>
|
|
<td>2.64</td>
|
|
<td>1.79</td>
|
|
<td>18.42</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">New York</th>
|
|
<td>4.07</td>
|
|
<td>2.77</td>
|
|
<td>1.82</td>
|
|
<td>17.98</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Florida</th>
|
|
<td>2.95</td>
|
|
<td>2.73</td>
|
|
<td>2.19</td>
|
|
<td>18.49</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Texas</th>
|
|
<td>3.16</td>
|
|
<td>2.50</td>
|
|
<td>2.22</td>
|
|
<td>18.47</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Virginia</th>
|
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<td>3.10</td>
|
|
<td>2.54</td>
|
|
<td>2.57</td>
|
|
<td>17.79</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Arkansas</th>
|
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<td>2.27</td>
|
|
<td>2.00</td>
|
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<td>2.39</td>
|
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<td>18.88</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Louisana</th>
|
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<td>2.24</td>
|
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<td>2.43</td>
|
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<td>1.76</td>
|
|
<td>18.93</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Oklahoma</th>
|
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<td>2.26</td>
|
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<td>2.56</td>
|
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<td>2.14</td>
|
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<td>17.84</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Georgia</th>
|
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<td>2.38</td>
|
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<td>2.10</td>
|
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<td>1.78</td>
|
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<td>18.51</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Tennessee</th>
|
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<td>2.35</td>
|
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<td>2.03</td>
|
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<td>1.03</td>
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<td>18.51</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">South Carolina</th>
|
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<td>2.03</td>
|
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<td>1.74</td>
|
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<td>1.75</td>
|
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<td>18.16</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Hawaii</th>
|
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<td>2.57</td>
|
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<td>2.47</td>
|
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<td>1.54</td>
|
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<td>16.19</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Kentucky</th>
|
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<td>2.10</td>
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<td>2.11</td>
|
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<td>1.12</td>
|
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<td>16.87</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Mississippi</th>
|
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<td>2.57</td>
|
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<td>2.33</td>
|
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<td>1.00</td>
|
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<td>15.88</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Alabama</th>
|
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<td>1.87</td>
|
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<td>1.74</td>
|
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<td>1.44</td>
|
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<td>16.03</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">West Virginia</th>
|
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<td>1.74</td>
|
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<td>1.51</td>
|
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<td>1.37</td>
|
|
<td>14.13</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">Puerto Rico</th>
|
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<td>0.45</td>
|
|
<td>0.45</td>
|
|
<td>0.51</td>
|
|
<td>8.18</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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<tfoot>
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<tr>
|
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<td class="noNotes" colspan="5"> </td>
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</tr>
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</tfoot>
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</table>
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</div>
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<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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<div class="lastNote">NOTE: Weights were used to adjust each state's values to the age/sex composition of the national 2001 award cohort. See the text for details.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>Variation in the cumulative percentage of employed beneficiaries is high, ranging from 9.6 percent in Puerto Rico and 18.7 percent in West Virginia to 41.5 percent in South Dakota. The median cumulative percentage employed was 30.0 percent in Oregon. Reflecting the fact that the four most populous states have cumulative employment rates below the median, the national mean is lower than the state median: 28.9 percent. In all states, a large majority of those who were employed had not completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> and had never had their benefits suspended or terminated for work. The percentage completing the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> ranges from 1.4 in Puerto Rico and 4.6 in West Virginia to 16.6 in South Dakota; the percentage with benefit suspension for work ranges from 0.9 in Puerto Rico and 3.2 in West Virginia to 10.0 in Minnesota; the percentage with benefits terminated for work ranges from 0.5 in Puerto Rico and 1.7 in West Virginia to 5.9 in Minnesota. Variation across states in all work-incentive statistics follows the pattern seen in the cumulative percentage employed, although inexactly.</p>
|
|
<p>We also find large cross-state variation in the cumulative percentage enrolled for services and cumulative years spent off the rolls for work (not shown). Intriguingly, there is a strong positive relationship between those two measures across states; the simple correlation coefficient is 0.64. The cause of this relationship is unclear. High service enrollment might contribute to high employment, but it seems likely that this is only part of the explanation, at best, because we know from national statistics that cumulative service enrollment is much lower than cumulative employment. The alternative, and perhaps more plausible, hypothesis is that beneficiaries in some states are more likely to work and leave the rolls than beneficiaries in other states because of differences in the distributions of personal characteristics (for example, health or functional limitations) or environmental differences (for example, the strength and nature of the economy, population density, availability of public transportation, and so forth), which could lead to greater utilization of <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> services in those states.</p>
|
|
<h3>More Recent Cohorts</h3>
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<p>The longitudinal analysis of the more recent cohorts (<span class="nobr">1997–2005</span>) allows us to compare the progress of these cohorts with that of the 1996 cohort for as long as the later cohorts are observed. It also provides some evidence on the extent to which policy change and the economic environment influence outcomes. We hypothesize that (1) the <span class="nobr">2000–2001</span> recession would have a negative employment impact on cohorts awarded benefits during that time; (2) the 2001 increase in the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income amount would reduce <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completions and exits from the rolls; and (3) the 1999 increase in the nonblind <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount, and subsequent indexing of the <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount to the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr>, would also reduce months off the rolls for work.</p>
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<p>The next three charts show clear evidence that the increase in the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income amount reduced <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completions and <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> months. They also suggest that the 2001 recession had a negative impact on many statistics, but do not provide clear evidence of any effects from the 1999 <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> increase. Each chart is shown similarly, with calendar year on the horizontal axis, outcome measure on the vertical axis, and each series corresponding to a cohort (all weighted to the 2001 cohort's age/sex composition), which can be identified visually by the starting point of the series (for example, the series starting in 1996 represents the weighted 1996 cohort). Moving from left to right, as the cohort becomes more recent, there are fewer years of data to show.</p>
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<p>In Chart 10, we compare the percentage of beneficiaries employed (that is, earning at least $1,000) in each calendar year across cohorts. Because we compute the employment statistics starting from the second postaward year, the series for the 1996 cohort starts with 1998, and the last series, starting in 2006, is for the 2004 cohort. Beneficiaries in the 1997, 1998, and 1999 cohorts all had higher employment rates in the second postaward year than those in the 1996 cohort, very likely reflecting strong economic growth during the period. As the economy entered into recession in 2001, the economic downturn appears to have affected all cohorts regardless of number of years on the rolls. Through 2000, the employment rates for the earlier cohorts appeared to be steady or increasing. The first employment rate observed for each cohort decreases steadily from 2001 through 2005 (for the 1999 through 2003 cohorts). Further, for each cohort the employment rate declines from 2001 through 2005, although the rate of decline slowed after 2003, as the economy recovered. It is somewhat surprising that the cohorts entering the rolls during and following the recession (2001 through 2003) do not return to work at higher rates than those who entered earlier, as presumably their entry was more likely to be caused by job loss for reasons other than their disability. It might be, however, that in comparison with their counterparts in the earlier cohorts, some who enter during a recession find it more difficult to return to work later because many of the jobs for which they have experience no longer exist. It is also possible that the high levels of <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr> during this period discouraged early return to work.</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart10">Chart 10.<br>Annual age/sex-adjusted percentage employed since the second postaward year, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart10.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="366" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 10. </span>Annual age/sex-adjusted percentage employed since the second postaward year, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1998–2006</span></caption>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="9" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
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<thead>
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<tr>
|
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<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
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<th colspan="9" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Award cohort year</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th scope="col">1996</th>
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<th scope="col">1997</th>
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<th scope="col">1998</th>
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<th scope="col">1999</th>
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<th scope="col">2000</th>
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<th scope="col">2001</th>
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<th scope="col">2002</th>
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<th scope="col">2003</th>
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<th scope="col">2004</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
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<td>15.54</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
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<td>15.53</td>
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<td>15.95</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
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<td>15.85</td>
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<td>16.31</td>
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<td>16.42</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
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<td>14.91</td>
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<td>15.35</td>
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<td>15.55</td>
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<td>15.79</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
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<td>13.98</td>
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<td>14.39</td>
|
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<td>14.69</td>
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<td>14.92</td>
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<td>15.41</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
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<td>13.22</td>
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<td>13.65</td>
|
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<td>13.90</td>
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<td>14.24</td>
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<td>14.64</td>
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<td>14.93</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
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<td>12.61</td>
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<td>13.11</td>
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<td>13.41</td>
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<td>13.80</td>
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<td>14.31</td>
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<td>14.58</td>
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<td>14.88</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
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<td>12.10</td>
|
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<td>12.61</td>
|
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<td>12.95</td>
|
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<td>13.37</td>
|
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<td>13.90</td>
|
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<td>14.30</td>
|
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<td>14.60</td>
|
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<td>14.56</td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
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<td>11.73</td>
|
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<td>12.25</td>
|
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<td>12.66</td>
|
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<td>13.18</td>
|
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<td>13.77</td>
|
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<td>14.25</td>
|
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<td>14.74</td>
|
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<td>14.74</td>
|
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<td>14.68</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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<tfoot>
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<tr>
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<td class="noNotes" colspan="10"> </td>
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</tr>
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</tfoot>
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</table>
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</div>
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<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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<div class="lastNote">NOTE: Weights were used to adjust the series to reflect the age/sex composition of the 2001 award cohort. See the text for details.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>We did find some positive signs among awardees in 2003, the first cohort that entered during the recovery, although their initial employment percentage is the lowest among all cohorts considered. Similar to the trend we see with the 1996 cohort, the employment percentage among awardees in 2003 appears to be on a rising path, with just 2 years of data for the second and third postaward years. The first (and only) observation for the 2004 cohort, in 2006, is also encouraging, as it is higher than the first observation for the 2003 cohort. It seems likely, however, that any positive trends after 2006 were short-lived because of the severe recession starting in 2008.</p>
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<p>Chart 11 compares the cumulative <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion percentage across the 10 study cohorts. To facilitate cross-cohort comparisons of outcomes for the same postaward year, we connect the points representing the second- and fourth-year values for each cohort (corresponding to the first and third full postaward year, respectively)—the two lines that cross the cohort lines in the exhibit. Because the statistics are age/sex adjusted, the shape of the cross-cutting lines quite likely reflect the effects of changes in policy or the economic environment. In the absence of any such changes, we would expect these lines to be nearly straight and horizontal.</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart11">Chart 11.<br>Age-adjusted cumulative percentage with <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart11.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="371" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 11. </span>Age-adjusted cumulative percentage with <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></caption>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="9" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
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<thead>
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<tr>
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<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
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<th colspan="9" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Award cohort year</th>
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<th rowspan="2" scope="colgroup">2nd year</th>
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<th rowspan="2" scope="colgroup">4th year</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th scope="col">1996</th>
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<th scope="col">1997</th>
|
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<th scope="col">1998</th>
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<th scope="col">1999</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2000</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2001</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2002</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2003</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2004</th>
|
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</tr>
|
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
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<td>0.67</td>
|
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
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<td>2.67</td>
|
|
<td>0.77</td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td>2.67</td>
|
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
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<td>4.37</td>
|
|
<td>3.03</td>
|
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<td>0.84</td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td>3.03</td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>5.65</td>
|
|
<td>4.84</td>
|
|
<td>3.09</td>
|
|
<td>0.85</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td>3.09</td>
|
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<td>5.65</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>6.70</td>
|
|
<td>6.23</td>
|
|
<td>4.98</td>
|
|
<td>3.28</td>
|
|
<td>1.16</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>3.28</td>
|
|
<td>6.23</td>
|
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</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>7.22</td>
|
|
<td>6.89</td>
|
|
<td>5.88</td>
|
|
<td>4.50</td>
|
|
<td>2.87</td>
|
|
<td>0.51</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>2.87</td>
|
|
<td>5.88</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>7.55</td>
|
|
<td>7.31</td>
|
|
<td>6.42</td>
|
|
<td>5.23</td>
|
|
<td>3.93</td>
|
|
<td>1.93</td>
|
|
<td>0.50</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>1.93</td>
|
|
<td>5.23</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>7.83</td>
|
|
<td>7.65</td>
|
|
<td>6.85</td>
|
|
<td>5.78</td>
|
|
<td>4.70</td>
|
|
<td>3.05</td>
|
|
<td>1.93</td>
|
|
<td>0.51</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
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<td>1.93</td>
|
|
<td>4.70</td>
|
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</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
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<td>8.12</td>
|
|
<td>8.00</td>
|
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<td>7.29</td>
|
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<td>6.34</td>
|
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<td>5.41</td>
|
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<td>4.06</td>
|
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<td>3.27</td>
|
|
<td>2.12</td>
|
|
<td>0.61</td>
|
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<td>2.12</td>
|
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<td>4.06</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
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<td>8.40</td>
|
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<td>8.35</td>
|
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<td>7.72</td>
|
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<td>6.89</td>
|
|
<td>6.10</td>
|
|
<td>4.98</td>
|
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<td>4.50</td>
|
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<td>3.68</td>
|
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<td>2.35</td>
|
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<td>2.35</td>
|
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<td>4.50</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
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<td>8.65</td>
|
|
<td>8.63</td>
|
|
<td>8.07</td>
|
|
<td>7.33</td>
|
|
<td>6.63</td>
|
|
<td>5.67</td>
|
|
<td>5.41</td>
|
|
<td>4.84</td>
|
|
<td>3.78</td>
|
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<td>2.20</td>
|
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<td>4.84</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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<tfoot>
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<tr>
|
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<td class="noNotes" colspan="12"> </td>
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</tr>
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</tfoot>
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</table>
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</div>
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<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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<div class="lastNote">NOTE: Weights were used to adjust the series to reflect the age/sex composition of the 2001 award cohort. See the text for details.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>Instead, what we see is a small but steady increase between the 1996 cohort and the 2000 cohort in the percentage of beneficiaries who complete the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> in the first year on the rolls, followed by a sudden drop for the 2001 cohort. After this drop, the first-year percentage starts to increase again, although quite slowly. A closer examination shows that the drop is not associated with the 2001 cohort alone. The substantial decline between calendar years 2000 and 2001 is also apparent when comparing second-year values (the lower horizontal line) between the 1999 and 2000 cohorts, as well as the third-year values between the 1998 and 1999 cohorts, and the fourth-year values between the 1997 and 1998 cohorts (the higher horizontal line).<sup><a href="#mn23" id="mt23">23</a></sup></p>
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<p>One obvious explanation for the decline from 2000 to 2001 is the substantial 2001 increase in the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income threshold. Numerous months that would have been counted as <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> months under the <span class="nobr">pre-2001</span> amount do not count under the higher value for 2001 and later years.<sup><a href="#mn24" id="mt24">24</a></sup> The decline stops with the 2001 cohort, the first cohort subject to the higher <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income threshold starting from its award year; later cohorts complete the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> at modestly higher rates, holding years since award constant.</p>
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<p>If the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> threshold increase was the only explanation for the difference between the experiences of the 2001 and the 1997 cohorts in their first 4 years on the rolls, then the impact of the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income increase, as of the fourth year on the rolls, would be a reduction in the cumulative <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion percentage from 6.2 percent (fourth-year value for the 1997 cohort) to 4.1 percent (fourth-year value for the 2001 cohort)—a 35 percent decline. However, it is unlikely that the increase in the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> threshold is the only factor behind the decline in <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion. In particular, the analysis of the employment statistics in Chart 10 suggests that the economic downturn and recovery played a role in the 2001 decline in <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion, as well as in the growth in <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion thereafter. The possible effect of stepped up <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr> activity on <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion is unclear. Increased terminations that are due to medical recovery would very likely reduce <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completions, but increased work <abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>s would most likely have the opposite effect.</p>
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<p>It is possible that the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> threshold increase only delayed <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion for some beneficiaries. We do not know the extent to which this increase reduced the number of awardees who eventually complete their <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>. However, the size of the differences between the series for the 1997 and 2001 cohorts suggests that the effect is more than just delay. The <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion percentage for the 2001 cohort at the end of its sixth year on the rolls, 5.7 percent, was below the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion percentage for the 1997 cohort by the end of its fourth year on the rolls, 6.2 percent. If this difference was explained solely by induced delays in <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion, then the length of the typical delay would have been greater than 2 years.</p>
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<p>Like the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion percentage, the cumulative percentage of awardees with at least 1 month of benefit suspension for work began to decline in 2001, holding years since award constant (Chart 12). Presumably the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> threshold increase also delayed initial benefit suspensions for work because suspensions only occur after <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion. The 1999 increase in the nonblind <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount and subsequent indexing to the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr> might also have had an effect. As a result, monthly earnings needed to be higher than before to trigger benefit suspension for work after June 1999, potentially delaying first benefit suspension and reducing the number of beneficiaries that ever reach that marker. However, Chart 12 shows no clear decline in suspensions (holding years since award constant) from 1998 through 2000—years that span the increase in the <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount and precede the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> threshold increase. This suggests that any effect of the 1999 increase in the <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount on months off the rolls for work was too small to discern in the cohort statistics. A separate analysis focusing on those beneficiaries who completed the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> in 1998 (regardless of when they entered <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr>) concludes that the increase in the <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount reduced their months off the rolls in 2000 by 6.5 percent (Schimmel, Stapleton, and Song 2010)—a substantial reduction, but not large enough to be visible in the statistics we report here.</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart12">Chart 12.<br>Cumulative age/sex-adjusted percentage with benefits suspended for work, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart12.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="370" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 12. </span>Cumulative age/sex-adjusted percentage with benefits suspended for work, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></caption>
|
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="9" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
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<thead>
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<tr>
|
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<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
|
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<th colspan="9" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Award cohort year</th>
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<th rowspan="2" scope="colgroup">2nd year</th>
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<th rowspan="2" scope="colgroup">4th year</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th scope="col">1996</th>
|
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<th scope="col">1997</th>
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<th scope="col">1998</th>
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<th scope="col">1999</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2000</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2001</th>
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<th scope="col">2002</th>
|
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<th scope="col">2003</th>
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<th scope="col">2004</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
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<td>0.13</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
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<td>1.10</td>
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|
<td>0.13</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td>1.10</td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
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<td>2.39</td>
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|
<td>1.24</td>
|
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<td>0.14</td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
|
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<td>1.24</td>
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<td> </td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>3.36</td>
|
|
<td>2.57</td>
|
|
<td>1.22</td>
|
|
<td>0.12</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
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<td> </td>
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<td>1.22</td>
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<td>3.36</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
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<td>4.15</td>
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<td>3.60</td>
|
|
<td>2.52</td>
|
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<td>1.19</td>
|
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<td>0.15</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
|
<td>1.19</td>
|
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<td>3.60</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
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<td>4.76</td>
|
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<td>4.36</td>
|
|
<td>3.48</td>
|
|
<td>2.46</td>
|
|
<td>1.24</td>
|
|
<td>0.12</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>1.24</td>
|
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<td>3.48</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>5.18</td>
|
|
<td>4.85</td>
|
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<td>4.09</td>
|
|
<td>3.22</td>
|
|
<td>2.27</td>
|
|
<td>0.97</td>
|
|
<td>0.11</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
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<td>0.97</td>
|
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<td>3.22</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
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<td>5.52</td>
|
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<td>5.23</td>
|
|
<td>4.52</td>
|
|
<td>3.78</td>
|
|
<td>2.99</td>
|
|
<td>1.91</td>
|
|
<td>0.88</td>
|
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<td>0.09</td>
|
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<td> </td>
|
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<td>0.88</td>
|
|
<td>2.99</td>
|
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</tr>
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<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>5.78</td>
|
|
<td>5.55</td>
|
|
<td>4.90</td>
|
|
<td>4.25</td>
|
|
<td>3.56</td>
|
|
<td>2.66</td>
|
|
<td>1.82</td>
|
|
<td>0.80</td>
|
|
<td>0.10</td>
|
|
<td>0.80</td>
|
|
<td>2.66</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
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<td>6.01</td>
|
|
<td>5.81</td>
|
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<td>5.22</td>
|
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<td>4.65</td>
|
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<td>4.03</td>
|
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<td>3.25</td>
|
|
<td>2.57</td>
|
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<td>1.73</td>
|
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<td>0.84</td>
|
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<td>0.84</td>
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<td>2.57</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
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<td>6.16</td>
|
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<td>6.01</td>
|
|
<td>5.44</td>
|
|
<td>4.95</td>
|
|
<td>4.37</td>
|
|
<td>3.67</td>
|
|
<td>3.11</td>
|
|
<td>2.40</td>
|
|
<td>1.63</td>
|
|
<td>0.76</td>
|
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<td>2.40</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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<tfoot>
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<tr>
|
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<td class="noNotes" colspan="12"> </td>
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</tr>
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</tfoot>
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</table>
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</div>
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<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
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<div class="lastNote">NOTE: Weights were used to adjust the series to reflect the age/sex composition of the 2001 award cohort. See the text for details.</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<p>Unlike the upswing seen for the percentage completing the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> starting with the 2002 cohort, the percentage with benefit suspension continues to decline for later cohorts, although the rate of decline appears to have diminished by the end of the period. It is likely that this reflects the lingering effects of the 2001 recession and might also reflect the 1999 increase in the <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount. Other policy initiatives designed to increase earnings and exits from the rolls began during this period—most notably the rollout of the Ticket to Work program, starting in 2002. The <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> evaluation found evidence that <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> increased service enrollment (Stapleton and others 2008; Thornton and others 2007), but any impacts of <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> on earnings or months of benefit suspension or termination for work were too small to detect. It is also possible that the expansion of counseling and advocacy services increased beneficiary awareness of how much they could earn without losing their benefits, so that some wishing to keep their benefits were more careful to keep their earnings below that level—a phenomenon known as "parking."</p>
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<p>To show the net effects of the economy, numerous policy changes, administrative/budget issues, and other factors relevant to suspension or termination for work across cohorts, we present age-adjusted cohort statistics on <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> years per 1,000 beneficiaries (Chart 13). Holding years since award constant, the 1997 cohort experienced the most such years, and each successive cohort has experienced fewer. As of the sixth year since award, the 1997 cohort had experienced 89 <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> years per 1,000 beneficiaries; for the 1999 and 2001 cohorts, the corresponding values are 77 years (13 percent lower) and 64 years (28 percent lower).</p>
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<div class="chartCenter">
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<div class="chart700">
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<div class="title" id="chart13">Chart 13.<br>Cumulative <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> years per 1,000 age/sex-adjusted awardees, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></div>
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<div class="scrollChart"><img src="v71n3p35_chart13.gif" alt="Line chart with tabular version below." width="700" height="349" /></div>
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<div class="table altTable"><a class="altToggle" href="">Show as table</a>
|
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<table>
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<caption><span class="tableNumber">Table equivalent for Chart 13. </span>Cumulative <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> years per 1,000 age/sex-adjusted awardees, by award cohort year, <span class="nobr">1996–2006</span></caption>
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<colgroup span="1" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="9" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:4em"></colgroup>
|
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<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" class="stubHeading" scope="colgroup">Year</th>
|
|
<th colspan="9" class="spanner" scope="colgroup">Award cohort year</th>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" scope="colgroup">4th year</th>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" scope="colgroup">6th year</th>
|
|
<th rowspan="2" scope="colgroup">8th year</th>
|
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</tr>
|
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<tr>
|
|
<th scope="col">1996</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">1997</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">1998</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">1999</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2000</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2001</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2002</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2003</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2004</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</thead>
|
|
<tbody>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1996</th>
|
|
<td>0.35</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1997</th>
|
|
<td>5.13</td>
|
|
<td>0.36</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1998</th>
|
|
<td>19.05</td>
|
|
<td>5.78</td>
|
|
<td>0.38</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">1999</th>
|
|
<td>38.41</td>
|
|
<td>20.73</td>
|
|
<td>5.68</td>
|
|
<td>0.33</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>38.41</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2000</th>
|
|
<td>60.95</td>
|
|
<td>41.23</td>
|
|
<td>20.12</td>
|
|
<td>5.42</td>
|
|
<td>0.39</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>41.23</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2001</th>
|
|
<td>85.89</td>
|
|
<td>64.52</td>
|
|
<td>39.74</td>
|
|
<td>19.45</td>
|
|
<td>5.89</td>
|
|
<td>0.30</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>39.74</td>
|
|
<td>85.89</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2002</th>
|
|
<td>111.66</td>
|
|
<td>89.00</td>
|
|
<td>60.82</td>
|
|
<td>37.21</td>
|
|
<td>18.73</td>
|
|
<td>4.52</td>
|
|
<td>0.29</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>37.21</td>
|
|
<td>89.00</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2003</th>
|
|
<td>137.84</td>
|
|
<td>114.31</td>
|
|
<td>82.96</td>
|
|
<td>56.48</td>
|
|
<td>34.84</td>
|
|
<td>15.37</td>
|
|
<td>4.08</td>
|
|
<td>0.26</td>
|
|
<td> </td>
|
|
<td>34.84</td>
|
|
<td>82.96</td>
|
|
<td>137.84</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2004</th>
|
|
<td>164.08</td>
|
|
<td>140.18</td>
|
|
<td>106.34</td>
|
|
<td>77.23</td>
|
|
<td>52.87</td>
|
|
<td>30.06</td>
|
|
<td>14.30</td>
|
|
<td>3.69</td>
|
|
<td>0.26</td>
|
|
<td>30.06</td>
|
|
<td>77.23</td>
|
|
<td>140.18</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2005</th>
|
|
<td>189.84</td>
|
|
<td>165.77</td>
|
|
<td>130.05</td>
|
|
<td>98.94</td>
|
|
<td>72.34</td>
|
|
<td>46.61</td>
|
|
<td>28.37</td>
|
|
<td>13.36</td>
|
|
<td>3.91</td>
|
|
<td>28.37</td>
|
|
<td>72.34</td>
|
|
<td>130.05</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="row">2006</th>
|
|
<td>214.71</td>
|
|
<td>190.68</td>
|
|
<td>153.32</td>
|
|
<td>120.71</td>
|
|
<td>92.37</td>
|
|
<td>64.06</td>
|
|
<td>43.97</td>
|
|
<td>26.60</td>
|
|
<td>13.15</td>
|
|
<td>26.60</td>
|
|
<td>64.06</td>
|
|
<td>120.71</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tbody>
|
|
<tfoot>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td class="noNotes" colspan="13"> </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tfoot>
|
|
</table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="firstNote">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>.</div>
|
|
<div class="lastNote">NOTE: Weights were used to adjust the series to reflect the age/sex composition of the 2001 award cohort. See the text for details.</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<h2>Conclusions and Policy Implications</h2>
|
|
<p>Knowing the extent to which disability beneficiaries find work can help shape the efforts of policymakers to encourage more beneficiaries to give up their benefits and become self-sufficient. In general, longitudinal statistics paint a somewhat more optimistic picture of the efforts of beneficiaries to find work than <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>'s published statistics, which are cross-sectional. The longitudinal statistics show that nearly 30 percent of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries eventually find work, and a small but nontrivial share (nearly 7 percent) have their benefits suspended for at least 1 month for work. These shares are much higher for the roughly <span class="nobr">one-quarter</span> of beneficiaries who enter the rolls before age 40.</p>
|
|
<p>Many beneficiaries return to work without ever having their benefits suspended or terminated for work. For instance, 21.5 percent of the 1996 cohort returned to work during the <span class="nobr">10-year</span> period, but never had even 1 <abbr class="spell">NSTW</abbr> month. In addition, benefit termination for work is sometimes followed by eventual reinstatement. There are numerous reasons for this, including increases in functional limitations and declines in health, but perhaps many of those beneficiaries would have earned enough to give up their benefits for an extended period if more assistance or better work incentives had been available.</p>
|
|
<p>Most beneficiaries who find work and use the work incentives do so during their first 5 years on the rolls—a finding that has implications for return-to-work initiatives. If beneficiaries are most likely to return to work during this period, perhaps work incentives should specifically target recent awardees. These findings also give policymakers a reason to pay close attention to how recent awardees respond to innovations in work incentives.</p>
|
|
<p>We also find that making changes to the <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> program to help beneficiaries increase earnings might not produce program savings, even if the changes increase exits from the rolls. This is because the program may end up providing additional support to those who would exit anyway. We illustrate this point by drawing some implications specific to the <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> program and the Benefit Offset National Demonstration (<abbr>BOND</abbr>).</p>
|
|
<h3>Implications for <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr></h3>
|
|
<p>The Ticket to Work program was designed to expand <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> financing for employment services for those who find work and have their benefits suspended or terminated. However, statistics show that 79 percent of beneficiaries in the 1998 cohort who had their benefits suspended or terminated for work never enrolled in <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>-financed services. <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> might therefore have expanded <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>-financed services to those who would have had their benefits suspended or terminated even if the services had been unavailable—a cost to <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> with no program savings unless such benefits were suspended or terminated for longer periods.</p>
|
|
<p>Among employment service recipients in the 1998 award cohort, the small share (17.7 percent) whose benefits were suspended for work might suggest to some that additional expenditures will at best result in only small benefit reductions, even if received by beneficiaries who would otherwise remain on the rolls. It would be premature, however, to draw this conclusion based on this finding alone. <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>'s payments to service providers depend on the number of months the beneficiary foregoes benefits for work, or the extent to which he or she achieves earnings that might lead to benefit suspension or termination. <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> has increased incentives for providers to help their beneficiary clients forego benefits for work for a long time; that could lead to more months of benefit suspension or termination for work than we find for the 1996 cohort.</p>
|
|
<h3>Implications for <abbr>BOND</abbr> and Other Employment Initiatives</h3>
|
|
<p>A similar observation applies to the benefit offset that is currently being tested under <abbr>BOND</abbr>. Under the offset, beneficiaries no longer lose all of their benefits if they engage in <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> after they complete the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> and grace period. Instead, annual benefits will be reduced by $1 for every $2 of countable earnings above the annualized <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount, paid on a monthly basis. If this offset had been in place for the 1996 cohort, at least 6.5 percent of beneficiaries would have used the offset within the next 10 years—that is, the percentage with benefits suspended because of work in at least 1 month of that period. Their benefits were zero for an average of 42 months, but would quite likely have been much higher under an offset.</p>
|
|
<p>To illustrate the possible magnitude of the benefit increase for these beneficiaries under a benefit offset, assume that they would have received partial payments under the benefit offset equal to half of the mean December 2008 disabled-worker benefit (after indexing). That would require their earnings, on average, to have exceeded the monthly <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount ($940 for nonblind beneficiaries in 2008) by an amount equal to the benefits they would have received if they had not engaged in <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>.<sup><a href="#mn25" id="mt25">25</a></sup> The total increase in benefits paid to this group over 10 years would have been $868 million.<sup><a href="#mn26" id="mt26">26</a></sup> The amount would have been higher if those who gave up benefits for work under current law earned less than assumed, and lower if they earned more. For the offset to achieve benefit-neutrality relative to current law (that is, not affect total <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> payments to the cohort), it would have had to induce an equal amount of benefit reductions for other beneficiaries.<sup><a href="#mn27" id="mt27">27</a></sup></p>
|
|
<p>The finding that most beneficiaries who use the offset will likely do so within their first 5 years on the rolls implies that the <span class="nobr">long-run</span> impacts of <abbr>BOND</abbr> might be quite different than the mean impacts for those observed in the demonstration. Most beneficiaries in the demonstration areas will have been on the rolls for many years before they become eligible to use the benefit offset, and many might be past the point where they could potentially increase their earnings and use the offset. To enable the <abbr>BOND</abbr> evaluation to assess <span class="nobr">long-term</span> impacts—when all beneficiaries will have been entered after the implementation of the offset—half of the beneficiaries offered the offset will be those who have been on the rolls for 36 or fewer months (Stapleton and others 2010).</p>
|
|
<p>More generally, longitudinal statistics show that the number of months spent off the rolls for work under current law is a small but nontrivial percentage of all months during the first 10 years after award. To produce benefit savings for <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>, any initiatives to increase months off the rolls for work would have to offset any additional payments made for the support of beneficiaries in months they would have been off the rolls in the absence of the initiative; in evaluation terminology, such payments represent a "base" that other savings will have to "buy" or offset to achieve benefit-neutrality. <abbr>BOND</abbr> illustrates this point, but it also applies to <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> to the extent that <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> makes outcome payments for some months in which Ticket participants would have been off the rolls even if they had not assigned their tickets.</p>
|
|
<p>Initiatives that are targeted more narrowly at beneficiaries who would not leave the rolls for work under current law and at reducing their benefits during the months in which they currently receive full benefits will have a smaller base to buy, but it may be very difficult to narrow the target of such initiatives in this manner without making them ineffective. <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> could, for instance, prohibit the employment network from making cash payments to their participant clients because such payments are especially attractive to beneficiaries who would exit on their own, but such payments might also be a very efficient means of providing other beneficiaries with the resources and incentives they need to exit the rolls for work. As another example, initiatives could be targeted at only those who have been on the rolls for at least 5 years, so that most beneficiaries who would exit the rolls on their own would already have done so, or at only those who are older than age 50, who rarely exit for work under current law. However, large shares of those who recently entered the <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> program and those who are relatively young return to work without having their benefits suspended or terminated, and assistance targeted at those individuals might be relatively effective in reducing benefits or increasing the number of months in which they forego benefits for work. Of course, targeting work support to certain groups of beneficiaries raises equity concerns that might make it unattractive, even if efficient.</p>
|
|
<p>In summary, the longitudinal statistics represent "good news" in that, compared with the cross-sectional statistics, they show more beneficiaries leaving the rolls after finding work. They also show that some beneficiaries return to work but do not leave the rolls; perhaps a change in the work incentives of the <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> program, such as those to be tested under <abbr>BOND</abbr>, would encourage such beneficiaries to become more self-sufficient.</p>
|
|
<h3>Implications for Future Work</h3>
|
|
<p>It is unfortunate that comparability issues undermine any attempt to assess whether the statistics for the 1996 and later cohorts presented here represent a substantive change in beneficiary work activity and suspensions or terminations for work relative to the statistics for the <span class="nobr">1980–1981</span> New Beneficiary Survey/New Beneficiary Follow-up cohort. The earlier statistics are broadly similar, but somewhat lower than what we find. It would be interesting to know how earlier cohorts faired relative to more recent cohorts. For instance, prior research has suggested that eligibility expansions (starting with the 1984 Amendments to the Social Security Act) and expansion of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work incentives (for example, the 1988 increase in the length of the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>, the 1990 and 1999 <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> increases, the 2001 <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income increase, and the 2002 introduction of <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr>) have increased the sensitivity of awards to layoffs caused by recessions, industrial restructuring, or other economic factors, with more workers induced to apply for benefits because of such layoffs than in the past (Autor and Duggan 2003). That would suggest that the share of new beneficiaries who are capable and interested in returning to work is larger today than in the 1980s. An analysis of the administrative data for earlier cohorts might substantially improve our understanding of how past programmatic and other changes affect the number of awards to individuals who return to work and influence the extent to which new beneficiaries eventually exit the rolls for work. Such an analysis might also provide information about the extent to which possible future policy changes, such as a benefit offset, might induce <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> entry of workers with disabilities who would benefit from an offset.</p>
|
|
<p>It would also be interesting to examine how the return-to-work activities of future award cohorts change in response to programmatic and economic factors. Those who receive their awards in 2009 will be the first full award cohort to receive tickets under the July 2008 <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> regulations. Whether they enroll for services at substantially higher rates than past cohorts will be telling. Effects on earnings and benefits are quite likely to take much longer to emerge, however, because the 2009 cohort entered the <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> program at the bottom of a business cycle that was the worst since the Great Depression. Given the experience of those who entered during the much weaker downturn from 2000 through 2002, it seems quite likely that we will see a substantial decline in the employment rates of new beneficiaries, even if service enrollment increases. Any contributions of the new <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> regulations to improvements in return-to-work outcomes might well be obscured until the economy substantially recovers and later cohorts receive their awards.</p>
|
|
<h2 id="appendix">Appendix</h2>
|
|
<div class="table">
|
|
<table>
|
|
<caption><span class="tableNumber">Appendix table. </span>Annual award cohort size and age/sex composition, by award year, <span class="nobr">1996–2005</span> (in percent)</caption>
|
|
<colgroup span="1" style="width:10em"></colgroup>
|
|
<colgroup span="10" style="width:5em"></colgroup>
|
|
<thead>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stubHeading" scope="col">Age/sex composition</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">1996</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">1997</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">1998</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">1999</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2000</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2001</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2002</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2003</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2004</th>
|
|
<th scope="col">2005</th>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</thead>
|
|
<tbody>
|
|
<tr class="shaded">
|
|
<th class="stub2" scope="row">Total number</th>
|
|
<td>591,493</td>
|
|
<td>562,998</td>
|
|
<td>578,504</td>
|
|
<td>590,023</td>
|
|
<td>597,925</td>
|
|
<td>665,135</td>
|
|
<td>719,109</td>
|
|
<td>747,777</td>
|
|
<td>762,234</td>
|
|
<td>785,405</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub3" scope="row">Women</th>
|
|
<td>44.2</td>
|
|
<td>45.6</td>
|
|
<td>46.5</td>
|
|
<td>47.0</td>
|
|
<td>46.7</td>
|
|
<td>47.1</td>
|
|
<td>47.2</td>
|
|
<td>47.2</td>
|
|
<td>47.5</td>
|
|
<td>48.0</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub3" scope="row">Men</th>
|
|
<td>55.8</td>
|
|
<td>54.4</td>
|
|
<td>53.5</td>
|
|
<td>53.0</td>
|
|
<td>53.3</td>
|
|
<td>52.9</td>
|
|
<td>52.8</td>
|
|
<td>52.8</td>
|
|
<td>52.5</td>
|
|
<td>52.0</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="rowgroup"><span class="nobr">18–39</span></th>
|
|
<td>24.7</td>
|
|
<td>23.1</td>
|
|
<td>22.4</td>
|
|
<td>21.9</td>
|
|
<td>21.9</td>
|
|
<td>22.2</td>
|
|
<td>21.7</td>
|
|
<td>20.7</td>
|
|
<td>19.9</td>
|
|
<td>19.5</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Women</th>
|
|
<td>42.4</td>
|
|
<td>44.6</td>
|
|
<td>45.6</td>
|
|
<td>46.3</td>
|
|
<td>46.5</td>
|
|
<td>46.8</td>
|
|
<td>47.2</td>
|
|
<td>47.6</td>
|
|
<td>47.8</td>
|
|
<td>48.0</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Men</th>
|
|
<td>57.6</td>
|
|
<td>55.4</td>
|
|
<td>54.4</td>
|
|
<td>53.7</td>
|
|
<td>53.5</td>
|
|
<td>53.2</td>
|
|
<td>52.8</td>
|
|
<td>52.4</td>
|
|
<td>52.2</td>
|
|
<td>52.0</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="rowgroup"><span class="nobr">40–49</span></th>
|
|
<td>23.6</td>
|
|
<td>23.2</td>
|
|
<td>23.6</td>
|
|
<td>23.6</td>
|
|
<td>22.8</td>
|
|
<td>22.6</td>
|
|
<td>22.6</td>
|
|
<td>22.4</td>
|
|
<td>22.0</td>
|
|
<td>22.0</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Women</th>
|
|
<td>46.3</td>
|
|
<td>48.0</td>
|
|
<td>48.7</td>
|
|
<td>49.2</td>
|
|
<td>49.0</td>
|
|
<td>49.4</td>
|
|
<td>49.7</td>
|
|
<td>49.4</td>
|
|
<td>49.7</td>
|
|
<td>49.9</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Men</th>
|
|
<td>53.7</td>
|
|
<td>52.0</td>
|
|
<td>51.3</td>
|
|
<td>50.8</td>
|
|
<td>51.0</td>
|
|
<td>50.6</td>
|
|
<td>50.3</td>
|
|
<td>50.6</td>
|
|
<td>50.3</td>
|
|
<td>50.1</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="rowgroup"><span class="nobr">50–61</span></th>
|
|
<td>44.6</td>
|
|
<td>46.4</td>
|
|
<td>46.8</td>
|
|
<td>47.1</td>
|
|
<td>47.2</td>
|
|
<td>47.7</td>
|
|
<td>48.2</td>
|
|
<td>49.0</td>
|
|
<td>49.7</td>
|
|
<td>50.0</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Women</th>
|
|
<td>45.3</td>
|
|
<td>46.1</td>
|
|
<td>47.1</td>
|
|
<td>47.6</td>
|
|
<td>47.2</td>
|
|
<td>47.2</td>
|
|
<td>47.1</td>
|
|
<td>47.0</td>
|
|
<td>47.3</td>
|
|
<td>48.1</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Men</th>
|
|
<td>54.7</td>
|
|
<td>53.9</td>
|
|
<td>52.9</td>
|
|
<td>52.4</td>
|
|
<td>52.8</td>
|
|
<td>52.8</td>
|
|
<td>52.9</td>
|
|
<td>53.0</td>
|
|
<td>52.7</td>
|
|
<td>51.9</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub0" scope="rowgroup">62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr></th>
|
|
<td>6.8</td>
|
|
<td>7.0</td>
|
|
<td>7.0</td>
|
|
<td>7.1</td>
|
|
<td>7.7</td>
|
|
<td>7.5</td>
|
|
<td>7.5</td>
|
|
<td>7.8</td>
|
|
<td>8.3</td>
|
|
<td>8.4</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Women</th>
|
|
<td>38.2</td>
|
|
<td>38.8</td>
|
|
<td>39.7</td>
|
|
<td>40.1</td>
|
|
<td>40.2</td>
|
|
<td>40.5</td>
|
|
<td>40.7</td>
|
|
<td>41.4</td>
|
|
<td>41.9</td>
|
|
<td>42.5</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<th class="stub1" scope="row">Men</th>
|
|
<td>61.8</td>
|
|
<td>61.2</td>
|
|
<td>60.3</td>
|
|
<td>59.9</td>
|
|
<td>59.8</td>
|
|
<td>59.5</td>
|
|
<td>59.3</td>
|
|
<td>58.6</td>
|
|
<td>58.1</td>
|
|
<td>57.5</td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tbody>
|
|
<tfoot>
|
|
<tr>
|
|
<td class="onlyNote" colspan="11">SOURCE: Analysis of <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiary records in the 2007 <abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>. </td>
|
|
</tr>
|
|
</tfoot>
|
|
</table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div id="notes">
|
|
<h2>Notes</h2>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt1" id="mn1">1</a> Unless otherwise indicated, statistics for "<abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries" in this article are combined statistics for three groups of <span class="nobr">Old-Age,</span> Survivors, and Disability Insurance (<abbr class="spell">OASDI</abbr>) beneficiaries: (1) disabled workers, (2) disabled adult children of other <abbr class="spell">OASDI</abbr> beneficiaries or deceased workers, and (3) disabled <span class="nobr">widow(er)s</span> of deceased workers. Disabled workers are by far the largest group. Reflecting the status of the primary beneficiary, benefits to disabled adult children are most often paid from the <span class="nobr">Old-Age</span> and Survivors Insurance (<abbr class="spell">OASI</abbr>) Trust Fund, rather than the Disability Insurance (<abbr class="spell">DI</abbr>) Trust Fund; disabled <span class="nobr">widow(er)</span> benefits are always paid from the <abbr class="spell">OASI</abbr> Trust Fund.</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt2" id="mn2">2</a> Extracts from several Social Security administrative files were merged to create the Ticket Research File (<abbr class="spell">TRF</abbr>), including the Disability Control File, Master Beneficiary Record, Supplemental Security Record, Numerical Identification System (Numident) file, and the 831 and <span class="nobr">832/33</span> Disability files.</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt3" id="mn3">3</a> The first payment month (that is, the award month) is the month in which the first payment was actually made, which is usually after the first month for which the beneficiary is entitled to a benefit (that is, the entitlement month). The latter is often used in <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>'s statistics to classify beneficiaries by entry year (for example, <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> 2009). We use the award month instead because our focus is on the activities of beneficiaries once they become informed of their award and are entitled to use the <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work incentives.</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt4" id="mn4">4</a> Because <span class="nobr"><abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>-911</span> data captures 90 percent of closures within 5 years of application, and the median time in the <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> program before exiting is 465 days for those with employment and 667 days for those without employment (<abbr class="spell">GAO</abbr> 2005), service enrollment statistics for 2004 and 2005 may be underestimated.</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt5" id="mn5">5</a> Specifically, the age/sex-adjusted statistics for each cohort are weighted means of statistics in eight categories defined by four age groups (<span class="nobr">18–39</span>, <span class="nobr">40–49</span>, <span class="nobr">50–61</span>, 62–<abbr class="spell">FRA</abbr>) and sex.</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt6" id="mn6">6</a> There are other <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> work-incentive programs (for example, impairment-related work expenses) that do not play a prominent role in this analysis and therefore are not described. For more detail, see Social Security's <i>2011 Red Book: A Summary Guide to Employment Support for Individuals with Disabilities under the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Programs</i>. In addition, other federal and state agencies also implemented or strengthened programs designed to help disability beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries return to work or increase their earnings during the period examined. Most notably, many states introduced Medicaid <span class="nobr">Buy-In</span> programs, which allow workers with disabilities (including <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> beneficiaries) to enroll in Medicaid for a sliding-scale premium, and many states' One Stop Employment Centers introduced Disability Program Navigators and took other steps to help job seekers with disabilities take advantage of available services.</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt7" id="mn7">7</a> The <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> legislation created an expedited reinstatement or "easy back on" provision where an individual who is terminated for work need not reapply, but is subjected to a process more akin to a continuing disability review (<abbr class="spell">CDR</abbr>).</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt8" id="mn8">8</a> The higher blind <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount was already indexed to the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr>, and it was only increased to keep up with the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr> in 1999.</p>
|
|
<p> <a href="#mt9" id="mn9">9</a> <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> implemented substantial changes in the <abbr class="spell">TTW</abbr> in July 2008, after the end of the period examined here.</p>
|
|
<p><a href="#mt10" id="mn10">10</a> There is one exception: Benefits would not be suspended if the first month with earnings above <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> (following the grace period) occurs 36 months after the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion or later.</p>
|
|
<p><a href="#mt11" id="mn11">11</a> Presumably benefits would have been paid during the months when a beneficiary was not earning more than the <abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr> amount.</p>
|
|
<p><a href="#mt12" id="mn12">12</a> As noted in the previous section, the 2006 data for this variable should be considered preliminary because 2006 <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> service entrants that did not assign their tickets and continued to receive services through the end of <abbr class="spell">FY</abbr> 2007 will not have a record in the <span class="nobr"><abbr class="spell">RSA</abbr>-911</span> data file.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt13" id="mn13">13</a> Muller (1992) noted that earnings reported to the Internal Revenue Service (<abbr class="spell">IRS</abbr>), the basis of our employment measure, can include those for work performed in a different year, such as delayed compensation, commissions, and vacation pay. It is for this reason that we did not include the first year after award in our employment and earnings statistics. Our annual estimates for later years quite likely reflect errors in the timing of work, but it seems much less likely that the cumulative statistics reflect such errors.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt14" id="mn14">14</a> One potentially important example of earnings not captured in the <abbr class="spell">IRS</abbr> data is the earnings of beneficiaries who work in sheltered workshops, which are not subject to payroll taxes.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt15" id="mn15">15</a> This description of the business cycle is based on statistics for real gross domestic product and civilian employment (Council of Economic Advisors 2011, Tables <span class="nobr">B-2</span> and <span class="nobr">B-3).</span></p>
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<p><a href="#mt16" id="mn16">16</a> The rule is simple: We exclude each ambiguous case if the month of first entitlement was more than 144 months before the first observed payment. Application of this rule excludes 2 percent of all beneficiaries who would otherwise have been included in each cohort and ranges from 1.7 percent in the 1996 cohort to 2.4 percent in the 2005 cohort. Conversely, the cases that are included despite the ambiguity ranged from 10.8 percent of all beneficiaries who would have been included without the rule in 1996 to 0.1 percent in the 2005 cohort. We perform a sensitivity analysis by excluding the ambiguous cases and discover that doing so would have no substantive impact on the findings for the 1996 cohort—the cohort most affected by the ambiguity of our current exclusionary rule. We later determine that about 25 percent of the excluded cases in each year comprised disabled adult children, and an additional 5 percent comprised disabled <span class="nobr">widow(er)s</span>. The first entitlement date of the excluded cases was actually the first entitlement date of the primary beneficiary. This represents about 9 percent and 4 percent of the disabled adult children and disabled <span class="nobr">widow(er)</span> awards, respectively; hence both groups of cases are somewhat underrepresented in each cohort. We do not think this has a material effect on the statistics or, more importantly, trends in the statistics.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt17" id="mn17">17</a> Because of data limitations previously discussed, paths for some beneficiaries do not follow the appropriate order. For example, some individuals indicate suspension or termination for work even though there is no documentation of a completed <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr>. We did some recoding (mostly on the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion variable, affecting 1.7 percent of the records) in order to correctly identify the paths for each individual. Other analyses in the article are based on the raw data and are not affected by this recoding and therefore may show slightly different statistics.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt18" id="mn18">18</a> The mean benefit for disabled workers in December 2008 was $1,063 per month (<abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> 2009, Table 2), equivalent to $12,756 per year. There were 591,493 beneficiaries in the 1996 award cohort (as shown in the <a href="#appendix">Appendix</a> table), so at that benefit level, forgone benefits for the entire cohort would be $1,063 x 230 x 12 x 591,493/1,000 = $1,735,369,482. This estimate is inexact, but is likely to be close. Mean benefits foregone by disabled workers whose benefits were suspended for work were somewhat higher than the mean benefits for all disabled workers in December 2008 ($1,186), but mean benefits for those terminated for work in 2008 were somewhat lower ($1,043); see <abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr> (2009, Tables 54 and 55). Only a very small share of the months in which benefits were foregone were for disabled adult children and disabled <span class="nobr">widow(er)s</span>, whose benefits were considerable lower ($660 and $646, respectively, in December 2008).</p>
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<p><a href="#mt19" id="mn19">19</a> The employment statistics in <a href="#chart4">Chart 4</a> are roughly comparable with those reported by von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (forthcoming), although time periods and definitions differ. The authors define employment as any positive earnings, based on the same data source that we use. They provide statistics for male applicants aged <span class="nobr">30–44</span> and <span class="nobr">45–64</span>, allowed at the state Disability Determination Service level only, during each of two periods: <span class="nobr">1982–1987</span> and <span class="nobr">1992–1997</span>. For both periods the authors find that about 20 percent of the younger men were employed in the third year after application, gradually declining to about 17 percent in the tenth year. The corresponding statistics for the older men are approximately 12 percent in the third year and 7 percent in the tenth year. The employment rates are slightly higher for those allowed in the more recent period than for those allowed in the earlier period.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt20" id="mn20">20</a> The earnings statistics in <a href="#chart6">Chart 6</a> are roughly comparable with those provided by von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (forthcoming) for men in the two allowed-applicant age groups, after inflation by 25 percent for the change in the <abbr class="spell">AWI</abbr> from 2000 through 2007. For their more recent period (<span class="nobr">1992–1997</span>), the authors find that allowed men aged <span class="nobr">30–44</span> at application with positive earnings had mean annual earnings of approximately $12,500 in the third year after application (adjusted to 2007 dollars), rising to approximately $15,500 in the tenth year. The comparable figure for men aged <span class="nobr">45–64</span> at application is approximately $10,000 in both the third and tenth years.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt21" id="mn21">21</a> Age-adjusted statistics for the 1998 cohort are shown in charts appearing later in the article.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt22" id="mn22">22</a> Although the presentation of the statistics might suggest that those passing one marker are always a subset of those passing what is normally the previous marker, this is not always true. For instance, some whose benefits are terminated for work did not experience a suspension for work first, and <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion is sometimes not recorded in the data for those whose benefits are suspended or terminated for work.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt23" id="mn23">23</a> The only exception is evident when comparing the fifth-year values between the 1996 and 1997 cohorts: We find an increase in the percentage with <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> completion from 2000 through 2001. This is not surprising, given the 1997 cohort in general appears to outperform the 1996 cohort. In fact, the rising trend indeed slowed down in 2001.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt24" id="mn24">24</a> There is no simple way to determine whether the <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> income increase had an impact on beneficiary behavior. It is possible, for instance, that some beneficiaries reacted by reducing their earnings to keep them below the new threshold and avoid using up <abbr class="spell">TWP</abbr> months and entering the <abbr class="spell">EPE</abbr>, but we suspect that extremely few beneficiaries are so well informed that they would engage in such strategic behavior, even if they had sufficient motivation to do so; in addition, reduction in working hours may not always be accommodated.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt25" id="mn25">25</a> For example, if the individual's benefit when not working was $1,000, but under current law the individual would give that benefit up to earn $1,940, then under the benefit offset the individual would receive a benefit of $500, assuming no change in earnings.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt26" id="mn26">26</a> This amount is half of the previously imputed value of $1.7 billion benefits foregone because of work by the 1996 award cohort as of 2006.</p>
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<p><a href="#mt27" id="mn27">27</a> Weathers, Hemmeter, and Wiseman (2010) found that the Benefit Offset Pilot Demonstration (<abbr class="spell">BOPD</abbr>), during which time the benefit offset was offered to small samples of volunteers in four states, had, if anything, a positive impact on the volunteers' mean benefits in the next 2 years. <abbr class="spell">BOPD</abbr> volunteers might be atypical of all potential benefit offset users, however, so <abbr>BOND</abbr> results might be quite different.</p>
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</div>
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<div id="references">
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<h2>References</h2>
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<p>Autor, David H., and Mark G. Duggan. 2003. "The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment." <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics </i>18(1): <span class="nobr">157–206</span> (February).</p>
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<p>Bound, John. 1989. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants." <i>American Economic Review</i> 79(3): <span class="nobr">482–503</span>.</p>
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<p>Chen, Susan, and Wilbert van der Klaauw. 2008. "The Work Disincentive Effects of the Disability Insurance Program in the 1990s." <i>Journal of Econometrics</i> 142(2): <span class="nobr">757–784</span> (February).</p>
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<p>Council of Economic Advisors. 2011. <i>2011 Economic Report of the President.</i> Washington <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: <abbr class="spell">CEA</abbr>.</p>
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<p>French, Eric, and Jae Song. 2009. "The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply." Working Paper Series, <abbr class="spell">WP</abbr> 2009-05. Chicago, <abbr title="Illinois">IL</abbr>: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.</p>
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<p>[<abbr class="spell">GAO</abbr>] Government Accountability Office. 2005.<i> Vocational Rehabilitation: Better Measures and Monitoring Could Improve the Performance of the <abbr class="spell">VR</abbr> Program</i>. Report to Congressional Committees, <abbr class="spell">GAO</abbr>-05-865. Washington, <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: <abbr class="spell">GAO</abbr>.</p>
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<p>Hennessey, John C., and L. Scott Muller. 1994. "Work Efforts of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries: Preliminary Findings from the New Beneficiary Follow-up Survey." <i>Social Security Bulletin</i> 57(3): <span class="nobr">42–51</span>.</p>
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<p>Livermore, Gina, David Stapleton, and Allison Roche. 2009. <i>Work Activity and Use of Employment Supports under the Original Ticket to Work Regulations: Characteristics, Employment, and Sources of Support among Working-Age <abbr class="spell">SSI</abbr> and <abbr class="spell">DI</abbr> Beneficiaries</i>. Final report. Washington, <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: Mathematica Policy Research (April).</p>
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<p>Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen, and Alexander Strand. 2011. "Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of <abbr class="spell">SSDI</abbr> Receipt." <abbr class="spell">MRRC</abbr> Working Paper 2010-241. Ann Arbor, <abbr title="Michigan">MI</abbr>: University of Michigan Retirement Research Center (January).</p>
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<p>Muller, L. Scott. 1992. "Disability Beneficiaries Who Work and Their Experience under Program Work Incentives." <i>Social Security Bulletin</i> 55(2): <span class="nobr">2–19</span>.</p>
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<p>Page, Jeremy, Lesley Hildebrand, Miriam Loewenberg, Dawn Phelps, and Natalie Justh. 2009. <i>Data Dictionary for the Ticket Research File</i>. Report prepared for the Social Security Administration, under contract <abbr title="number">no.</abbr> 0600-03-60130. Washington, <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: Mathematica Policy Research.</p>
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<p>Schechter, Evan S. 1997. "Work While Receiving Disability Insurance Benefits: Additional Findings from the New Beneficiary Follow-up Survey." <i>Social Security Bulletin</i> 60(1): <span class="nobr">3–17</span>.</p>
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<p>Schimmel, Jody, and David C. Stapleton. 2011. "Disability Benefits Suspended or Terminated Because of Work." <i>Social Security Bulletin </i>71(3): <span class="nobr">83–103</span>.</p>
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<p>Schimmel, Jody, David C. Stapleton, and Jae Song. 2010. "How Common is 'Parking' among Social Security Disability Insurance (<abbr class="spell">SSDI</abbr>) Beneficiaries? Evidence from the 1999 Change in the Level of Substantial Gainful Activity (<abbr class="spell">SGA</abbr>)." <abbr class="spell">MRRC</abbr> Working Paper 2009-220. Ann Arbor, <abbr title="Michigan">MI</abbr>: University of Michigan Retirement Research Center (October).</p>
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<p>[<abbr class="spell">SSA</abbr>] Social Security Administration. 2009. <i>Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program</i>. Baltimore, <abbr title="Maryland">MD</abbr>: Office of Retirement and Disability Policy (July).</p>
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<p>———. 2010. <i>Full Medical Continuing Disability Reviews: Evaluation Report</i>, A-07-09-29147. Baltimore, <abbr title="Maryland">MD</abbr>: Office of the Inspector General (March).</p>
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<p>Social Security Advisory Board. 2006. <i>Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials</i>. Washington, <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: <abbr class="spell">SSAB</abbr> (May).</p>
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<p>Stapleton, David, Gina Livermore, Craig Thornton, Bonnie O'Day, Robert Weathers, Krista Harrison, So O'Neill, Emily Sama Martin, David Wittenburg, and Debra Wright. 2008. <i>Ticket to Work at the Crossroads: A Solid Foundation with an Uncertain Future</i>. Washington, <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: Mathematica Policy Research.</p>
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<p>Stapleton, David, Stephen Bell, David Wittenburg, Brian Sokol, Debi McInnis, Anne Ciemnecki, Bonnie O'Day, Michelle Derr, Judith Feins, and Daniel Gubits. 2010. <i><abbr>BOND</abbr> Implementation and Evaluation: <abbr>BOND</abbr> Final Design Report</i>. Washington, <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: Abt Associates.</p>
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<p>Thornton, Craig, Gina Livermore, Thomas Fraker, David Stapleton, Bonnie O'Day, David Wittenburg, Robert Weathers, and others. 2007. <i>Evaluation of the Ticket to Work Program: Assessment of Post-Rollout Implementation and Early Impacts</i>. Washington, <abbr class="spell">DC</abbr>: Mathematica Policy Research (May).</p>
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<p>von Wachter, Till, Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester. Forthcoming. "Trends in Employment and Earnings of Allowed and Rejected Applicants to the Social Security Disability Insurance Program." <i>American Economic Review</i>. </p>
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<p>Weathers, Robert, Jeffrey Hemmeter, and Michael Wiseman. 2010. "The <abbr class="spell">SSDI</abbr> 'Benefit Offset' Experiment: Landing the Pilots." Paper prepared for the Fall 2010 Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Boston, <abbr title="Massachusetts">MA</abbr> (November <span class="nobr">4–6</span>). Baltimore, <abbr title="Maryland">MD</abbr>: Social Security Administration.</p>
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